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MICRO-OFFSETS AND MACRO-TRANSFORMATION: AN
INCONVENIENT VIEW OF CLIMATE
CHANGE JUSTICE
Michael P. Vandenbergh*
Brooke A. Ackerly**
Fred E. Forster***
We have been asked to examine climate change justice by discussing the methods of allocating the costs of addressing climate change among nations. Our analysis suggests that climate and justice goals cannot be achieved by better allocating
the emissions reduction burdens of current carbon mitigation proposals - there
may be no allocation of burdens using current approaches that achieves both climate and justice goals. Instead, achieving just the climate goal without exacerbating justice concerns, much less improving global justice, will require focusing on
increasingwell-being and inducingfundamental changes in development patternsto
generate greater levels of well-being with reduced levels of materialthroughput. We
identify several core characteristicsof the public and private policy architectures
and initiatives necessary to accomplish this task. We also propose examples of
short- and long-term initiatives. Our near-term approachrecognizes that a focus on
public law remedies and nation-states is necessary but not sufficient. We suggest a
feasible new mechanism, equity micro-offsets, that could reduce emissions while improving well-being among the poor. Equity micro-offsets can harnessaltruisticpreferences, market mechanisms, andprivate oversight to reduce emissions and increase
well-being in poor countries. Equity micro-offsets also suggest the nature of the
long-term political, social, and economic macro-transformationthat may be necessary. From household cook stove initiatives to policy architectures that include forestry, agriculture,and other overlooked sectors, achieving climate andjustice goals
will require transformative approaches, not just improved cost allocations.
INTRODUCTION

As any professor knows, when confronted with a hard problem, the first
tendency of many students is to make assumptions that cause the problem to
disappear. Too many modern approaches to climate justice take this approach. They either assume away the climate goal or the justice goal, or
they implicitly concede that these goals will not be achieved at all, or will
only be achieved with radical technological advances or other heroic developments. In some cases they do so in transparent ways. In other cases, they
do so through opaque assumptions in mathematical models. By avoiding the
hard truth about the depth of the problem, these approaches delay development of the deep structural changes necessary to reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change.
* Professor of Law, Co-Director, Regulatory Program, and Director, Climate Change Research Network, Vanderbilt University Law School. The authors would like to thank Lisa
Bressman and Jonathan Gilligan for valuable comments, and the editors of the Harvard Environmental Law Review for sponsoring a timely symposium and providing outstanding assistance with the preparation of this Article. We also would like to thank Ben Berlin, Cullen
Newton, Ben Seeger, and John Synowicki for research assistance.
** Associate Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University.
*** Research Coordinator, Climate Change Research Network, Vanderbilt University Law
School.
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Scholars have offered a number of thoughtful examinations of the deontological and welfarist reasons to achieve climate and justice goals, and
we do not re-plow that ground in this Article.' Instead, we assume that
policymakers should seek to achieve a substantial reduction in the risks of
catastrophic climate change and to improve the welfare of the poor around
the globe.2 We also assume that achieving any meaningful climate goal will
require a post-Kyoto agreement that all major emitting nations join in and
comply with over time.' For the major players to join in the agreement, they
must view it to be in their interest, accounting for the cost of greenhouse gas
("GHG") emissions reductions, the avoided cost of climate change, the impacts on justice, and other concerns.
On the surface, many economic analyses and proposals by governments
and non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") offer optimistic views and
policy architectures. 4 They suggest that climate goals can be achieved with
small percentage reductions in global world product ("GWP") or gross domestic product ("GDP"). They offer a variety of ways to induce participation by developing countries and to address justice issues, often through
reduced or delayed emissions reduction burdens for developing countries5
that will enable substantial per capita income growth in those countries.
Drawing on recent developments in the economics and climate science liter'See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565,
1611-12 (2008); Daniel A. Farber, The Moral Casefor Climate Compensation: Doing Justice
in a Complex World, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 377; Matthew D. Adler, Corrective Justice and
Liability for Global Warming, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1859, 1861-62 (2007). Climate justice
issues arise in several ways. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Brooke A. Ackerly, Climate
Change: The Equity Problem, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 75-76 (2007) (noting that the costs of
climate change and climate change mitigation are likely to be inequitably distributed); Brooke
Ackerly & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change Justice: The Challengefor Global Governance, 20 GEO. INT'L ENvnL. L. REv. 553, 555-56 (2008) (noting the global justice concern
associated with the ceiling on economic activity that may occur because of carbon constraints).
2 See Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, Designing the Post-Kyoto Climate Regime:
Lessons from the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements (Nov. 24, 2008) (unpublished interim report), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Interim%2OReport%20081203%2oAkiko%20v6.pdf (identifying principles).
'See Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The Complex Climate
Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675, 1676
(2008); Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate Change Policy and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 1805, 1823-24 (2008); ScoTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE?: THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY
GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 93, 162-64 (2007) (discussing importance of incentives).
4 See, e.g., Valentina Bosetti et al., Modeling Economic Impacts of Alternative International Climate Policy Architectures:A Quantitative and ComparativeAssessment of Architectures for Agreement (Harvard Project on Int'l Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 08-20,
2008), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/CarraroWeb3.pdf (examining eight
"policy architectures").
'See, e.g., Jing Cao, Reconciling Human Development and Climate Protection:Perspectives from Developing Countries on Post-2012 InternationalClimate Change Policy (Harvard
Project on Int'l Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 08-25, 2008), available at http://belfer
center.ksg.harvard.edu/files/CaoWeb2.pdf (proposing allocation that allows substantial growth
in per capita income in developing countries); Jeffrey Frankel, An Elaborated Proposal For
Global Climate Policy Architecture:Specific Formulas and Emission Targetsfor All Countries
in All Decades (Harvard Project on Int'l Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 08-08, 2008),
available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/-jfrankel/SpecificTargets2008HPICA.pdf (proposing
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atures, we examine the intuitive plausibility of these approaches. We conclude that although on the surface a number of proposed policy architectures
are politically viable, address justice issues, and have reasonably low mitigation costs, upon closer inspection they rest on implausible assumptions and
avoid many hard questions.
The most important assumption in proposed policy architectures is that
they will achieve an adequate reduction in the risk of catastrophic climate
change. Numerous governmental and private entities have articulated a goal
of achieving the emissions reductions necessary to limit temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius ("°C") over pre-industrial era levels, 6 a target
that will require stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide equivalents ("CO 2eq") at roughly 450 ppm. 7 Even at 450 ppm CO2eq,
there is still a substantial risk of higher temperatures, including temperatures
that could lead to catastrophic climate change. 8 Thus, even at 450 ppm
CO 2eq the likelihood of catastrophic climate change is far greater than the
likelihood that your house will burn down. 9 Unfortunately, many proposed
architectures do not purport to achieve atmospheric concentrations in the
450 ppm CO 2 eq range and thus have little prospect of achieving the 2'C
target.' 0 Some will achieve temperature increases closer to 3°C, and others
will not even do that." The implicit assumption in these proposals is that it
is acceptable to miss the widely adopted target. This assumption may be
allocation that allows business as usual emissions for developing countries for decades before
requiring reductions).
6 See discussion infra notes 56, 92-96, and accompanying text.

Assessments of the atmospheric concentration of CO 2 or CO 2eq necessary to achieve
stabilization at 2'C vary, but the 450 ppm CO 2eq level is supported by a number of sources.
See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC"), CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE

2007:

MITIGATION

39 tbl.TS.2 (2007) [herein-

after IPCC AR4 WG Ill], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg3.htm (noting
that the Category I emissions scenario generates a CO 2eq atmospheric concentration range of
445 to 490 ppm, which is associated with a temperature range of 2.0 to 2.4'C); Nicholas Stem,
The Economics of Climate Change, 98 AM. ECON. REv. (PAPERS & PROC.) 1, 5 tbl. 1 (2008)

(noting a 78% likelihood of exceeding a 2°C increase at 450 ppm CO 2eq); Ross GARNAUT,
THE GARNAUT CLIMATE CHANGE REvIEw 192-94 (2008), available at http://www.garnautreview.org.au/index.htm (follow link for PDF of full report) (discussing various temperature and
atmospheric concentration targets). CO2 is the GHG responsible for more than 80% of anthropogenic radiative forcing, and CO 2eq is the combination of the six most important greenhouse
gases. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF
THE IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL BASIS 210-16 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC

AR4 WG I], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wgl.htm.
I See Stem, supra note 7, at 5 tbl. 1 (noting that at 450 ppm CO 2eq there is an 18% likelihood of a 3°C temperature increase, a 3% likelihood of a 4°C increase, and a 1% likelihood of
a 5°C increase).
9 See, e.g., Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 91 REv. ECON. & STAT. 1, 18 (2009) (noting that "[olne might try
to compare numbers on, say, a homeowner buying fire insurance ... with cost-benefit estimates of the world buying an insurance policy going some way toward mitigating the extreme
high-temperature possibilities"); see also infra notes 70-75 (discussing likelihood of catastrophic climate change).
10See Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at 11 fig.3.
1 Id.
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rational based on one's risk tolerance. Climate sensitivity may be less than
current models suggest, or the costs of the necessary emissions reductions
may be greater than the harms of catastrophic climate change. But unless
the likelihood that these architectures will miss the 2°C mark is clear, it will
be difficult for policymakers to develop and weigh options that achieve that
goal. In addition, even policy architectures that are designed to achieve temperature changes well above 2°C rely on aggressive assumptions about the
deployment of new and existing technologies, as well as perfect markets and
policy implementation.' 2
The use of aggressive assumptions is fueled by the magnitude of the
task. For example, even to achieve a global GHG target of roughly 650 ppm
CO 2eq (a target far above the 450 ppm CO 2eq target associated with the 2°C
goal) by using nuclear power alone would require the addition of a new,
standard-sized (1000 megawatt) nuclear power plant every day for the next
fifty years, in addition to substantial increases in efficiency and conservation.' 3 To achieve a 650 ppm CO 2eq target with solar power would require
twenty-seven square kilometers of solar cells every day over that
installing
4
period.1
The assumptions regarding developing country incentives are similarly
aggressive. Many policy architectures assume that developing countries can
be induced to participate by allowing substantial emissions growth and per
capita income growth in those countries.' 5 Essentially, developing countries
are encouraged to develop and lock in a fossil fuel-driven industrialized society for decades before strong incentives push them to make the same transition that developed countries must make in the near future. Yet, to achieve
an atmospheric GHG target of 450 ppm CO 2eq, global per capita GHG emissions in 2050 need to be at roughly the current level of India (two metric
tons of CO 2eq), a level that is one-tenth of the United States (over twenty

2 See discussion infra notes 86-110 and accompanying text; see also Stem, supra note 7,
at 23.
"3See Nathan S. Lewis, Professor, Cal. Inst. of Tech., Talk: Chemical Challenges in Renewable Energy 2-8 (transcript available at http://nsl.caltech.edu/files/energy-notes.pdf).
Lewis's global energy demand estimate for 2050 of twenty-eight terawatts ("TW") assumes
substantial demand-side energy efficiency and conservation efforts. See id. at 5. Lewis notes
that "stabiliz[ing] at 550 ppm CO 2 would require =20 TW of carbon-free power." Id. at 7.
The nuclear 20 TW calculation is 20,000 plants (up from 400 today), each with 1000 megawatt
("MW") capacity, installed over a period of fifty years. See id. at 7-8. Lewis's estimate of
550 ppm CO 2 is roughly equivalent to 650 ppm CO 2eq, based on the Category IV stabilization
range. See IPCC AR4 WG 11I,supra note 7, at 39 tbl.TS.2.
14 Lewis, supra note 13, at 12. Lewis notes that producing 20 TW of power from solar
energy, assuming 10% conversion efficiency, would require covering "0.16% of the earth's
surface, or 5x10" m 2 with panels. Id. To achieve this capacity in 50 years would require
installing 27,400,000 m2 of panels per day. Note that producing 3 TW in the United States
would require 1.7% of the country's land, and "covering every home rooftop in the entire U.S.
would generate only 0.25 TW of power." Id.
" See discussion infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text; see also Frankel, supra note
5, at 7.
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tons) and less than one-half of China (over five tons). ,6 If per capita income
growth is to be the vehicle for inducing developing countries to participate
in a global agreement, it must occur with little or no per capita emissions
growth for many developing countries, and substantial net declines for
others.
The justice issue further complicates the task. We began our research
with the assumption that a deep tension exists between the climate and justice goals, but our analysis suggests that just achieving the climate goal
alone cannot occur without progress toward global justice. At the outset, it
is hard to imagine overall improvements in the welfare of the poor in a
world undergoing catastrophic climate change. 7 Further, a pure GHG strategy that does not account for justice concerns will not achieve the participation of the major developing countries that are essential to meeting
atmospheric GHG targets.'" Finally, a GHG strategy that does not account
for the relationship between poverty alleviation and GHG emissions will
overlook important emissions reductions, 19 and may even induce lifestyle
changes that could increase emissions, further undermining the ability to
achieve GHG targets. The framing of the climate justice issue as a matter of
global income inequality constrains the set of proposed solutions to an untenable subset. If global justice requires ameliorating global income inequality by raising people out of poverty,' 0 and poverty alleviation is
synonymous with improvements in the per capita income of people in poverty,2 ' and carbon emissions are closely associated with per capita income,
then simply increasing per capita income is likely to make it very hard to
achieve GHG emission reduction targets.22

,6 See discussion infra notes 110-I1 and accompanying text. Per capita CO 2eq emissions
are based on data for 2005 from World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool
(CAIT) version 6.0 (2009), available at http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?page=yearly&mode=
view. ' See
Miles R. Allen & David J. Frame, Call off
the Quest, 318 SCIENCE 582, 582 (2007)
(noting that "[o]nce the world has warmed by 4 [degrees] C, conditions will be so different
from anything we can observe today ... that it is inherently hard to say when the warming will

stop");

RICHARD POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE

46, 197 (2004) (discussing the

challenges posed by abrupt climate change). Although improvements in other aspects of life
(e.g., disease reduction, increases in consumer goods) achieved through allocations of resources to areas other than emissions reductions may enhance welfare, truly catastrophic climate change would make these other welfare-enhancing developments difficult to achieve.
' See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated
on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REv. 51 (2009) [hereinafter Posner & Sunstein, Per
Capita]; Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Global Warming and Social Justice, REGULATION, 9Spring 2008, at 14, 17-20 [hereinafter Posner & Sunstein, Social Justice].
See Ackerly & Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 554.
20
UNITED NATIONS, Tm MILLENNIUM DEvELoPmENT GOALS REPORT 5 (2008), available
at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdffhe%20Millennium%2Development%2Goals%
20Report%202008.pdf (noting the "multiple dimensions of poverty").
21 See, e.g., Jing Cao, supra note 5, at 14 (adjusting emissions allocations to account for
personal incomes).
22
See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L. REv.
905, 919 (2008) (discussing research on the Kuznets Curve and GHG emissions).
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We suggest that greater attention should be directed toward developing
policy architectures and initiatives that can improve the well-being of people
in poverty in ways that also reduce carbon emissions. We call the political,
social, and economic changes necessary to alleviate poverty while reducing
GHG emissions "macro-transformation." We do not know precisely how
this macro-transformation can or will take place, and we are not naive about
the magnitude of the task, but we argue that the debate should begin now. It
should not be delayed until the unrealistic assumptions underlying the current climate change policy architecture proposals become apparent.
We assume that macro-transformation will require architectures that
provide incentives for developing countries to transition directly from preindustrial or semi-industrial to post-industrial societies, leap-frogging fossil
fuel-based industrialization. Achieving macro-transformation will require
substantial modifications to global and national public and private climate
change governance schemes, and will require integration of GHG emissions
reductions goals into many policies and institutions that are now unaffected
by GHG considerations, particularly those focused on development. We
also assume that macro-transformation will require policy architectures and
initiatives that alleviate poverty by improving well-being, not just by increasing per capita incomes. We believe there is reason for optimism in the
robust literature in economics and other fields that suggests that improvements in well-being can be achieved not just through increases in per capita
income, but through changes in other aspects of life less closely correlated
with GHG emissions, such as maternal and child survival, health, education,
and access to safe water.23 We also believe that recent initiatives focused on
households, forests, and agriculture in developed and developing countries
identify the types of paths that more widespread transformation may take.
In short, this frank truth is lurking too far beneath the surface of climate
justice debates: no plausible collection of conventional initiatives, whether
emissions allocations, compliance deadlines, or feasible side payments, is
likely to induce the major emitting countries to participate in an international
agreement that will achieve the temperature targets necessary to substantially reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change. By making assumptions about a more lenient temperature target, technological and other
developments, and the ability to address poverty through per capita income
increases, too many proposed approaches fail to address the hardest question: are these measures enough? The tendency to avoid this hard question is
understandable. Those who worry most about climate may be willing to set
unrealistic targets or use other unrealistic assumptions to avoid undermining
public support. Those who worry most about the economic costs of mitigation or are skeptical of climate science may be willing to do the same to
ensure that mitigation costs are low. Those who worry most about the poor
may be willing to do the same to maximize the chance that governments will
adopt policies that alleviate poverty.
23 See discussion infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
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It is possible that a lenient temperature target combined with optimistic
technology, poverty alleviation, and other assumptions will lead to a successful resolution of the global political impasse. Parties may begin to take
actions they would not otherwise take, resulting in patterns of behavior that
facilitate future international agreements, domestic policies, and private market responses. But there is a tremendous opportunity cost. The time spent
designing policy architectures and initiatives that may require future modification could instead be spent designing architectures and initiatives that are
more likely to achieve the climate change goal. If we confront the problem
head-on, it might be possible to achieve the climate and justice goals through
adding new types of short-term measures that buy time on the climate front
(e.g., equity micro-offsets) and to foster a longer term re-conceptualization
of emissions reduction methods (macro-transformation). When combined
with global public governance schemes such as cap-and-trade programs and
carbon taxes, as well as major technological developments, these political,
social, and economic transformations may increase the prospects that developed and developing countries will view steep emissions reductions as in
their interest, and may enable aggressive emissions targets to be achieved,
not assumed away.
We present our analysis in two Parts. In Part I, we examine the plausibility of achieving a viable climate solution with the current proposed policy
architectures. We identify substantial doubts that they will achieve widely
accepted temperature targets. In Part II, we identify several core characteristics of more transformative approaches. We also propose equity micro-offsets as one near-term climate change response that will use private markets
to harness altruistic and climate norms to generate emissions reductions and
increased welfare among the world's poor. Equity micro-offsets are GHG
offsets generated by funding actions that reduce emissions from individuals
who are at or below the poverty level. We also identify the contours of the
macro-transformation that may be necessary by providing examples of existing public and private initiatives that integrate climate and justice goals by
design.
I.

PROPOSED GLOBAL CLIMATE ARCHITECTURES

Our first point is that achieving climate and justice goals will be very
difficult with conventional policy architectures and initiatives. By policy
architectures, we mean the high-level allocations of benefits and burdens in
any international treaty or other public governance scheme.2 4 An example is
24See generally Bosetti et al., supra note 4.

David Victor points out that the ultimate

resolution may involve a collection of regional agreements with limited connections. See
David G. Victor, Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations: Implicationsfor the
Design of Effective Architectures, in ARCHIrECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-KyoTo WORLD 133 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins eds.,

2007).
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a global cap-and-trade scheme along with the accompanying allocation of
emissions and compliance deadlines. By climate change policy initiatives,
we mean the specific steps that are likely to be conducted pursuant to the

policy architecture. Examples include a GHG tailpipe standard for cars, a
renewable energy requirement for electric utilities, or a requirement for carbon capture and storage. We focus principally on policy architectures in this
Part.

The hard questions regarding climate justice are difficult to confront in
part because numerous variables and inconsistent terminology make it a
challenge to analyze policy architectures and to identify important assumptions and implications. 5 We are bound to have made errors in several
places. At the same time, we believe that it is possible to assemble a sufficiently complete story to test the plausibility of the proposed policy
architectures.
Part L.A discusses our rationale for testing the plausibility of the assumptions underlying conventional policy architectures. Part I.B examines
the features of the leading architectures, and Part I.C identifies assumptions
that undermine the plausibility of the proposed architectures.
A.

An Intuitive Plausibility Test

We examine the plausibility that the proposed policy architectures will
substantially reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change. In using a plau-

sibility test rather than a quantitative model, we recognize that some degree
of rigor will be lost, and precise assessments will not be possible. Neverthe-

less, we believe that a test for intuitive plausibility can expose weaknesses in
the accuracy of assumptions and outcomes that may not be apparent from
other methodologies.2 6
The value of plausibility testing is an important aspect of an exchange

taking place among William Nordhaus, Martin Weitzman, and other econo25 For example, reports vary regarding the GHG type used for the policy target (e.g., CO 2
or CO 2eq), the emissions source categories included (e.g., industry-only or all sources), the
timing and amount of emissions reductions that will achieve particular atmospheric targets, the
benchmark year for calculating emissions reductions, the atmospheric targets that will achieve
desired temperature targets, whether peak values or values at stabilization should be used, the
probabilities and magnitudes of climate harms and costs that may arise from those harms, the
impact of various allocations of burdens and benefits on the incentives of developed and developing countries, and the impacts of those allocations on climate and justice goals. See, e.g.,
Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at 5 tbl.l (noting that some policy architectures identify GHG
targets and others do not); see also Joseph E. Aldy et al., Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of
Global Climate Policy Architectures, 3 CLIMATE POL'Y 373 (2003) (reviewing a number of
climate change policy architectures).
26 See Martin L. Weitzman, Reactions to the Nordhaus Critique (Feb. 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). Weitzman suggests
that testing intuitive plausibility is not necessarily an "airtight or rigorous" approach, but on
an intuitive basis "it should be sufficiently convincing to make a plausible presumptive case
that there may be a serious mistreatment of uncertainty in the 'standard' [cost-benefit analysis]
of climate change." Id. at 2.
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mists. Nordhaus's work with cost-benefit models has helped to establish the
dominant view that gradual emissions reductions are the preferable response
to global GHG emissions.2" In recent years, Weitzman and others have argued that the dominant economic analysis of climate change fails to account

adequately for the low probability, high consequence events associated with
extreme climate change and that standard economic analyses are relatively

insensitive to these risks.2" The debate is vigorous and is already beginning
9
2
to affect the thinking of legal scholars and policymakers.

Underlying much of the exchange is Weitzman's willingness to subject
climate change cost-benefit models to a critique based on the intuitive plau-

sibility of the model's assumptions and outputs. According to Weitzman, if
the model fails the test, deep structural uncertainties may undermine its conclusions. These uncertainties should be addressed, even if doing so yields

policy advice that is accurate but characterized more by "fuzziness" than
precision.30 Weitzman notes that economists have a significant influence on
policymaking in large part because their models generate precise answers to

difficult policy questions.31 If the models are not only precise but also accu-

rate, they enable policymakers to devote appropriate levels of resources to
the climate problem; but there is a difference between precision and accu-

27 See

WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS

& JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC MOD-

ELS OF GLOBAL WARMING (2000); William D. Nordhaus, The Challenge of Global Warming:
Economic Models and Environmental Policy 166 (July 24, 2007) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/dice mss_072407-all.pdf); Robert Mendelsohn,
Chapter 8: Robert Mendelsohn, Yale University, in YALE SYMPOSIUM ON THE STERN REvIEw
93, 95 (2007), available at www.ycsg.yale.edu/climate/stern.html. The Nordhaus approach
has been enormously influential in the academic and policy realms. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, From Montreal to Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007)
(comparing costs and benefits of efforts to reduce GHGs and ozone-depleting chemicals).
2 See, e.g., Weitzman, supra note 9; see also Stem, supra note 7, at 3. The implication
for policymakers is that reductions should be larger and occur earlier than suggested by the
Nordhaus approach. See, e.g., Martin L. Weitzman, Some Basic Economics of Extreme Climate Change 3-4 (Working Paper, Feb. 19, 2009), available at http://www.economics.harvard.
edu/faculty/weitzman/files/Coumot%2528Weitzman%2529.pdf.
29 Compare William D. Nordhaus, An Analysis of the Dismal Theorem (Cowles Found. for
Research in Econ., Discussion Paper No. 1686, 2009), available at http://cowles.econ.yale.
edu/P/cd/dl6b/d1686.pdf, with Weitzman, supra note 26. The effect of the debate on policymakers is reflected in a recent article by Peter Orszag, who is now White House Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB") Director. Peter R. Orszag & Terry M. Dinan, Response,
Comment on Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law
Inst.) 10,579-81 (2008); see also Melinda Kimble & Letha Tawney, The Tale of the Fat Tail,
ENvTL. F., forthcoming May/June 2009.
30 Weitzman, supra note 9, at 2.
3 Weitzman, supra note 26, at 14-15 (noting that "economists make a living from plugging rough numbers into simple models and reaching specific conclusions (more or less) on
the basis of these numbers.... The public has little tolerance for ambiguity and craves some
kind of an answer .... "). Economic climate models are sophisticated and opaque to the nonexpert, yet yield enormously influential, precise values or ranges of values for the optimal
expenditures to reduce GHG emissions. See, e.g., NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 27, at
69-74.
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racy. An inexpensive 3digital
watch may tell time to the tenth of a second,
2
yet be off by an hour.
Our effort here is in a similar vein. The recent economic meltdown
suggests that sophisticated models built on prior experience sometimes yield
precise but inaccurate answers when they fail to account for low probability,
high consequence events.33 A simple plausibility analysis several years ago
might not have yielded precise results, but it might have induced policymakers to take a second look at the financial system while many policy responses were still available. 34 We identify substantial concerns about the
plausibility of many conventional climate change policy architectures.
B.

The Happy Story: Proposed Climate Change Policy Architectures

The principal challenge confronting climate change policymakers is to
allocate the benefits and burdens in ways that will induce a sufficient number of the major emitters to participate and yet achieve the desired atmospheric GHG targets. At first glance, the prospects for such an agreement
look good. For example, the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report ("AR4") by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC") provides an3anal5
ysis that suggests that the emissions reduction costs are not daunting. Of
the five categories of emissions scenarios analyzed in the AR4, Categories
III and IV have been the focus of much attention by policymakers and academicians.

6

The Category III scenarios, which stabilize atmospheric con-

centrations at roughly 550 ppm CO 2eq,3 7 would result in a temperature
increase of 2.8'C to 3.2°C above pre-industrial levels. 8 Achieving these
32See, e.g., John H. Lienhard, Engines of Our Ingenuity No. 1742: Accuracy as Precision,

http://www.uh.edu/engines/epi1742.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2009) (on file with the Harvard
Environmental Law Review) (discussing difference between precision and accuracy, using the
example of digital and analog watches).
33See, e.g., David Segal, In Letter, Warren Buffett Concedes a Tough Year, N.Y. TIMEs,
Mar. 1, 2009, at A16 (quoting Warren Buffett for the proposition that "'[t]he stupefying
losses in mortgage-related securities came in large part because of flawed, history-based models"' and noting that Buffett recently criticized "the perils of relying on mathematical models
devised without worst-case situations in mind").
34See, e.g., Michael Lewis, The End, PORTFOLIO, Dec. 2008, at 114 (describing how Steve
Eisman profited by betting against how rating agencies were assessing subprime loans and
noting that he "called Standard & Poor's and asked what would happen to default rates if real
estate prices fell. The man at S&P couldn't say; its model for home prices had no ability to
accept a negative number").
" See IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 205-06 (noting percentage impact on GDP
ranging from single-digit losses to slight gains). The language used by the Framework Convention on Climate Change is to avoid "dangerous anthropogenic interference" ("DAI") with
the climate, and the avoidance DAI goal is a focus of the IPCC economic analysis. Id. at 194.
36 See, e.g., Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at 6 (identifying 550 CO eq ppm target); Simon
2
Dietz et al., Right for the Right Reasons: A Final Rejoinder on the Stern Review, 8

WORLD

ECON. 229 (2007) (discussing policy allowing for scenarios of 650 to 750+ ppm CO 2eq).
7IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 198 tbl.3.5, 229 tbl.3.10. We use 550 ppm CO 2eq
as a rough approximation of the AR4 CO 2eq range of 535 to 590. The AR4 also provides a
CO2 figure of 450 ppm CO 2, or a range from 440 to 485 ppm. Id.
38 Id. at 229 tbl.3. 10. AR4 Category III atmospheric concentrations are similar to the
stabilization at 500 to 550 ppm CO 2eq examined by the Stem Review. See id. at 206. Stern
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concentrations requires emissions reductions that cause total global emissions to peak within twenty-five years, and by 2050 to be between 30% less
and 5% more than year 2000 levels.3 9 Costs are expected to be in the range

of 0.2 to 2.5% of GDP by 2030, with a 2050 GDP loss that ranges from
slightly negative to 4%; by 2100, the GDP losses range from slightly negative to 6.5%. 40
Similarly, AR4 Category IV stabilizes atmospheric CO2 concentrations
at roughly 650 ppm CO 2eq and would result in a temperature increase of
3.2 0 C to 4.0°C.4 1 Category IV concentrations could be achieved if total

global emissions growth by 2050 is limited to an increase of 10 to 60% from
2000 levels. 42 Costs are expected to be in the range of -0.6% to 1.2% of
GDP by 2030, with a 2050 GDP loss that ranges from -1% to 2%; by 2100,
the GDP losses range from -1.6% to 5%.43

These IPCC projections are essentially a consensus view, and they are
somewhat comforting. Low single-digit global GDP losses, while not insig-

nificant, do not suggest insuperable problems. With these types of target
concentrations and costs as a backdrop, scholars have proposed a number of
policy architectures designed to induce participation in a global climate
change agreement by developed and developing countries. Scholars have

suggested that under a number of different emissions reduction allocations
there is some prospect that the major developed and developing nations will

view joining in and complying with an international climate agreement to be
in their interest. 44 For example, Bosetti et al. recently used a climate-energyeconomy model to examine the economic and climate impacts of eight proposed climate policy architectures, including a cap-and-trade scheme with

redistribution, a cap-and-trade scheme with the addition of a program for
reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation ("REDD"), a global
carbon tax, formation of clubs of countries, a research and development
scheme, and others. 45 Most of these approaches appear to reach stabilization
at just under 3°C, suggesting that they would achieve CO 2eq levels roughly

estimates that cuts of 30 to 50% by 2050 are necessary to achieve stabilization at 550 ppm
CO 2eq, and suggests that these levels could be achieved with a cost of 1% of world GDP or
about $30 per ton of CO 2 by 2030. Stem, supra note 7, at 3. Stabilization at 550 ppm CO 2eq
would require global emissions to peak in the next twenty years. Id. at 7.
31 IPCC AR4 WG ml,supra note 7, at 198 tbl.3.5, 227, 229 tbl.3.10.
I Id. at 205-06. The Stern Review GDP loss estimate for roughly the same atmospheric
concentration is between -2% and +5%. Id. at 206.
4, Id. at 198 tbl.3.5, 229 tbl.3.10. Note that as stated by the IPCC, the figure we identify
as roughly 650 ppm CO 2eq (stated as a range of 590 to 710 ppm CO 2eq) corresponds roughly
with our 550 ppm CO 2 figure (stated as a range from 485 to 570 ppm CO). Stern has expressed disagreement with economists who have argued for stabilization levels at or above 650
ppm CO 2eq. See Stem, supra note 7, at 6 (citing Nordhaus, supra note 27, at 166, and Mendelsohn, supra note 27, at 95).
42 IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 198 tbl.3.5, 229 tbl.3.10. This would require total
cumulative emissions not to exceed 2270 to 3920 GtCO2. Id. at 198.
43Id. at 205-06.
4See Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at 4-5 (reviewing recent models).
45 Id.
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comparable to AR4 Category III, or roughly
550 ppm CO 2eq. None would
46
generate costs that exceed 1.5% of GWP.
A number of proposals have focused on providing the incentives necessary to induce the major developing countries to participate in an international agreement. For example, India and Germany have proposed
convergence between developed and developing country per capita emissions levels, followed by joint reductions. 47 This approach would enable the
developed and developing countries to meet in the middle of the current per
capita emissions ranges to allow emissions growth and economic growth by
developing countries. After the developing countries have gained the economic benefits associated with emissions growth and the developed countries have demonstrated good faith and incurred the costs of reducing
emissions toward the convergence point, both the developed and developing
countries would reduce emissions to comparable levels. 41 Other proposals
use limited or delayed GHG reduction
targets to create incentives for devel49
oping countries to participate.
In addition, a number of proposed policy architectures explicitly address poverty alleviation. 0 For example, the Greenhouse Development
Rights ("GDR") concept developed by EcoEquity and the Stockholm Environment Institute would allocate emissions reductions based on national responsibility for and capacity to reduce emissions, and it would exclude
emissions associated with individuals whose annual income and consumption are below $7500 from any country's capacity and responsibility for
emissions reductions."s A benefit of the GDR approach is that it acknowledges that there are poor and wealthy individuals in developing and developed countries, and it enables a nation-state level allocation to be made that
accounts for these populations. 2 Other proposals exclude emissions from
individuals at other levels, such as $9000 per capita income. s3 The effect of

46Id. at 10, 13.

" See Robert Engelman, Sealing the Deal to Save the Climate, in STATE OF THE WORLD
2009: INTO A WARMING WORLD 169, 184 (Linda Starke ed., 2009); Stem, supra note 7, at
28-31. In 1997, Brazil proposed allocation based on stocks, or historical contributions. See
Proposed Elements of a Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Presented by Brazil in Response to the Berlin Mandate, (submitted May 28, 1997),
available at http://unfccc.int/cop4/resource/docs/l1997/agbm/miscOla3.htm.
48 See Jing Cao, supra note 5, at 10, 11.
'9 See Frankel, supra note 5, at 16 fig.2. By participate, we mean both to enter into and
comply with an agreement to reduce GHG emissions.
50 See, e.g., Jing Cao, supra note 5, at 11 (citing PAUL BAER ET AL., THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT

IN A CLIMATE

CONSTRAtNED

WORLD: THE GREENHOUSE

DEVELOPMENT

RIGHTS

FRAMEWORK (2007)); see also Aldy & Stavins, supra note 2, at 9, 19.
"' See Engelman, supra note 47, at 185-86. EcoEQurrY & STOCKHOLM ENV'r INST., ExECUTIVE SUMMARY, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN A CLIMATE CONSTRAINED WORLD: THE
GREENHOUSE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 2-3 (2d ed. 2008), available at www.ecoe-

quity.org/GDRs/GDRsExecSummary.html.
52 See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1582 (noting that "[n]ations are not
people; they are collections of people, ranging from very rich to very poor").
" See Jing Cao, supra note 5, at 11.
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these approaches is to generate emissions allocations that allow for and induce per capita income growth among the poor.
In sum, the implications of the IPCC AR4 and a wide range of proposed policy architectures are that an international climate agreement can be
secured that will achieve climate- goals, will be affordable using conventional approaches, and will result in poverty alleviation. This is the happy
story.
C.

The Other Story: The Plausibility of Proposed Policy Architectures

The other story is more troubling. A number of extremely optimistic
assumptions undermine the plausibility of the proposed policy architectures.
Our analysis raises serious doubts about whether any conventional policy
architecture will achieve a viable agreement that substantially reduces the
risk of catastrophic climate change. 4
1. Atmospheric and Temperature Targets
The first concern is that the dominant policy architectures seek to
achieve atmospheric concentrations and temperatures that do not meet the
widely adopted 2'C temperature target, and the higher temperature targets of
the proposed architectures will leave surprisingly high likelihoods of catastrophic climate harms. Policymakers first converged on 2°C almost two
decades ago as the upper bound of the temperature increase as compared to
pre-industrial levels that can occur without an unacceptable increase in the
risk of catastrophic climate change. 5 Presumably to achieve a target temperature increase of roughly 2°C, public international organizations in the

51 Some modeling results demonstrate the difficulty of relying only on conventional approaches. For example, one model suggests that even with a target of 550 CO 2eq, the largest
emitting nations must substantially reduce emissions by 2050, including 80% reductions by the
United States and slower emission growth rates by China. Even in this scenario, the planet is
likely to be 4 to 6°C warmer. See Richard Harris, Innovation Seen as Key to Curbing Climate
Change, NPR, Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1002294
50 (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). To achieve a lower atmospheric
concentration such as 400 ppm CO 2eq, one scenario would require that the eight largest industrialized nations and the biggest rapidly industrializing nations, including China and India,
each reduce emissions by 5% per year, and would require stable emissions from the rest of the
world. The costs would be in the tens of trillions of dollars. Id.
11In 1990, the WMO/ICSU/UNEP Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases ("AGGG")
concluded that 2°C was "an upper limit beyond which the risks of grave damage to ecosystems, and of non-linear responses, are expected to increase rapidly." AGGG, STOCKHOLM
ENvmL. INST., REPORT OF WORKING GROUP II OF THE AGGG, TARGETS AND INDICATORS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE (1990); see also IPCC AR4 WG HI, supra note 7, at 99. The European
Union adopted the 2°C target on November 15, 2007, in a European Parliament Resolution.
Resolution on Limiting Global Climate Change to 2°Celsius - The Way Ahead for the Bali
Conference on Climate Change and Beyond, EUR. PARL. Doc. (COP 13 and COP/MOP3) 1-2
(2007), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeilUDownloadSP.do?id= 14318&numrep
=7021 &language=en.
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developed world,56 national governments, provinces and states57 and other
sub-national governments," private corporations,59 and non-governmental

organizations 6° have coalesced around an emissions reduction goal for the
developed world of roughly 80% by 2050.
Despite the widespread adoption of the 2°C goal, it is difficult to identify a proposed policy architecture that seeks to achieve 2°C or less. 61 For
example, the eight policy architectures evaluated by Bosetti et al. generate
temperature increases in the 2.5 to 3°C range, which is roughly consistent

5 For example, after adopting the 2°C target in 2007, the European Parliament adopted
the "Florenz report," which calls for the European Union to reduce GHG emissions to 80%
below 1990 levels by 2050. See 2050: The Future Begins Today - Recommendations for the
EU's Future Integrated Policy on Climate Change, EUR. PARL. Doc. 2008/2105 (INI) (2009),
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6TA-2009-0042+ODOC+XML+VO//EN&Ianguage=EN. AR4 Category I atmospheric concentrations, which would achieve a 2.0 to 2.4°C temperature target, would require 80% to 95%
emissions reductions from developed countries by 2050. See IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7,
at 776 box 13.7.
17 For example, California has set emissions reductions targets for all GHGs to 2000 levels
by 2012, 1990 levels by 2020, and 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. Cal. Exec. Order No. S-305 (2005), available at http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/energy/ExecOrderS-3-05.htm. Florida has
set emissions reduction targets for all GHGs to 2000 levels by 2017, 1990 levels by 2025, and
80% below 1990 levels by 2050. Fla. Exec. Order No. 07-127, at 2 (2007), availableat http://
www.flgov.compdfs/orders/07-127-emissions.pdf. The New Jersey Global Warming Response Act limits the level of statewide GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, and 80%
below 2006 levels by 2050. Assem. 3301, 212th Leg., § 2 (N.J. 2007), available at http://
www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A3500/330lR2.PDF.
58 The members of the U.S. Conference of Mayors adopted a resolution calling for reduction of all GHG emissions 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. 76TH U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, CITY PRIORITIES FOR A CAP AND TRADE SYSTEM (2008), available at http://www.us
mayors.org/resolutions/76th-conference/energy- 11 .asp.
" As of January 2009, the members of the United States Climate Action Partnership
("USCAP"), including more than two dozen large corporations, have supported a GHG emissions goal of 97 to 102% of 2005 levels by 2012, 80 to 86% of 2005 levels by 2020, 58% of
2005 levels by 2030, and 20% of 2005 levels by 2050. See U.S. CLIMATE ACTION P'smrP, A
BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION 5 (2009), available at http://www.us-cap.org/pdf/USCAPBlueprint.pdf.
o The signatories to the American College and University Presidents Climate Commitment have called for an 80% reduction in emissions of all GHGs by 2050, although the commitment does not specify a baseline. Am. Coll. & Univ. Presidents Climate Commitment,
American College & University Presidents Climate Commitment 1 (2008), available at http://
www.presidentsclimatecommitment.org/html/commitment.pdf. Hundreds of college and university presidents have signed the commitment. American College & University Presidents
Climate Commitment, Signatories of the ACUPCC, http://www.presidentsclimatecommitment.
org/html/signatories.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental
Law Review).
6 One NGO advocates a 350 ppm CO 2 standard, which would translate to roughly 400 to
450 ppm CO 2eq, but the group has not proposed a policy architecture for achieving this target.
See Understanding 350, http://www.350.org/understanding-350 (last visited Apr. 17, 2009) (on
file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (identifying a strategy of political activism
to encourage international consensus that would "put a high enough price on carbon that we
stop using so much" and to effectively reduce "carbon 80% by 2050," and mentioning that
this would entail a switch to non-coal energy, better land-use, and waste reduction); see also
IPCC AR4 WG Ill, supra note 7, at 229 tbl.3.10 (noting that 350 ppm CO 2 is consistent with
445 ppm CO 2eq).
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If emis-

level, stabilization will occur at atmos-

pheric concentrations of roughly 550 ppm CO 2eq and with a temperature
increase of 2.8 to 3.2'C. 63 If emissions are reduced to the AR4 Category IV
level, stabilization will occur at atmospheric concentrations of roughly 650
ppm CO 2eq and a temperature increase of 3.2 to 4°C over pre-industrial
levels. 64 None of the architectures evaluated by Bosetti et al. will limit likely
temperature increases to65 2°C or less, and all would allow increases approaching 3°C or more.
The bad news is that even if we assume that these temperature targets

will enable emissions allocations that achieve a viable international agreement (a point we return to in the next Section), the targets will leave a substantial possibility of catastrophic climate change. 66 Only AR4 Category I,
the most aggressive of the four AR4 categories, has the prospect of achieving the 2°C target, and even then it will do so only if the actual temperature
67
increases are at the lowest end of the projected temperature range : AR4
Category I stabilizes atmospheric concentrations at roughly 450 ppm
CO2eq,6 s which would result in a temperature increase of roughly 2.0 to
2.4°C.69
a.

Climate Economics: Tail Risks

Now the truly bad news. Recent developments suggest that the risk of
catastrophic climate change is even greater than when policymakers set the
70
targets at 2°C and when the risks were identified in the AR4. As discussed
above, economists and climate scientists have become increasingly focused
on the risks that remain even at atmospheric concentrations of 450 to 550
ppm CO 2eq. Perhaps the most accessible presentation of these thick tail
Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at 11. Current atmospheric concentrations are roughly 430
ppm CO2eq and are increasing by over 2 ppm per year. See Stem, supra note 7, at 4; see also
W.L. Hare, A Safe Landing for the Climate, in STATE OF THE WORLD 2009: INTO A WARMING
WORLD, supra note 47, at 13.
63 IPCC AR4 WG M, supra note 7, at 229 tbl.3.10.
64Id.
65 Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at I I fig.3, 11-12, 15. The lowest likely temperature increase in the eight policy architectures examined by Bosetti et al. is over 2.5'C. Id. at I1 fig.3.
I The 2007 IPCC AR4 suggests that an atmospheric concentration range of 500 to 550
ppm CO 2eq, at the low end of the Category III levels, will leave an 80% risk that wanning will
exceed 3°C. The risk will be much higher at Category IV levels. See IPCC AR4 WG III,
supra note 7, at 227 tbl.3.9; Hare, supra note 62, at 13-22, 23 (noting that stabilizing at 475
ppm CO 2eq still generates a 50% risk that warming will exceed 2°C).
67 Hare, supra note 62, at 25 (noting that achieving 2°C peak temperature would require
400 ppm CO 2eq levels).
6' The IPCC AR4 refers to concentrations of between 350 and 400 ppm CO , and CO eq
2
2
at 445 to 490 ppm. IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 198 tbl.3.5, 229 tbl.3.10.
69 Id.; see also Hare, supra note 62, at 28 (noting that it is unlikely that this scenario will
stabilize temperatures at 2'C or less).
70 Hare, supra note 62, at 19 (noting that "[a] warming of 2 degrees Celsius is clearly not
'safe' and would not prevent, with high certainty, dangerous interference with the climate
system").
62
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risks appears in Table 1, which was published by economist Sir Nicholas
Stern in 2008.
TABLE

1.

PERCENT LIKELIHOOD OF EXCEEDING A TEMPERATURE INCREASE
AT EQUILIBRIUM

71

Stabilization Level
(ppm of C0 2eq)
450 ppm

78

18

3

1

0

0

500 ppm

96

44

11

3

1

0

550 ppm (doubling)

99

69

24

7

2

1

650 ppm

100

94

58

24

9

4

750 ppm

100

99

82

47

22

9

If the analysis presented in Table I iscorrect, even at 450 ppm CO 2eq
(roughly the AR4 Category I level, which is substantially lower than the
targets of many proposed policy architectures) there is a substantial likelihood of temperature increases in the 3 to 5OC range. At CO 2eq atmospheric
concentrations of 550 ppm (roughly the AR4 Category III level, and a common target for proposed policy architectures) there is a substantial likelihood
of temperature increases of 5°C or more. 72 At temperatures in this range, the
ice and snow cover around the world may disappear, and sea level rises of
73
ten meters or more could occur.
In addition, economist Martin Weitzman reads the six emissions scenarios in the IPCC AR4 to imply a mean temperature increase of 2.8°C, with
about a 2% chance of a greater than 6'C temperature increase.7 4 He asserts
that 2% is a far higher probability than the risks tolerated in many other
areas and that at 60C or higher, conditions will be "in the terra incognita of
what any honest economic modeler would have to admit is a planet Earth
reconfigured as science fiction." 75 Although Weitzman and others are debating the appropriate treatment of thick tail risks, and it is too soon to know
how the debate will be resolved, the debate should at a minimum give us
pause about whether the atmospheric target assumptions embedded in the
7'Stem, supra note 7, at 5 tbl.l (citing work of the Hadley Center as published in the
Stem Review).
72Id.

71Id. at 6. The Garnaut Climate Change Review concluded that temperature increases
above 5. VC would "result in a severe" reduction in human welfare. "Their impacts on human
civilisation and most ecosystems are likely to be catastrophic." GARNAUT, supra note 7, at
263. 7
Martin L. Weitzman, A Review of The Stem
Review on the Economics of Climate
Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 703, 716 (2008).
75Id.
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leading proposed policy architectures will leave unacceptably high risks of
catastrophic climate change.
b.

Climate Science: Post-AR4 Developments

In addition, recent climate science suggests that earlier analyses under-

76
estimated both the extent and impact of future atmospheric GHG stocks.

First, new research suggests that a substantial amount of temperature increase, changes in weather patterns, and sea level rise will occur and will be
77
"largely irreversible" even based on existing atmospheric GHG levels.

Second, carbon emissions are growing at a faster rate than projected by the
IPCC, although the growth will be reduced in the near-term by the economic
crisis. 78 Third, Arctic sea ice is melting faster than projected by the IPCC.7 9
Sea ice reflects most of the sun's energy, but open ocean serves as a giant

sponge, absorbing most of that energy and contributing to additional icemelting and warming, and additional releases of carbon dioxide and methane.80 Recent scientific studies suggest that even at 2°C the Arctic summer
ice, and eventually the Greenland ice sheet, may be lost, and that the widelyreported AR4 projection of a 0.18 to 0.59 meter sea level rise by 2100 is too
conservative.8' Finally, Antarctica is warming and has been losing glacial

mass at an increasing rate. 82 The recent scientific developments have in-

76 See, e.g., Cameron Hepburn & Nicholas Stem, A New Global Deal on Climate Change,
24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 259, 265 (2008); see also D.A. Stainforth et al., Letter, Uncertainty in Predictions of the Climate Response to Rising Levels of Greenhouse Gases, 433
NATURE 403 (2005); Malte Meinshausen, What Does a 2'C Target Mean for Greenhouse Gas
Concentrations? A Brief Analysis Based on Multi-Gas Emission Pathways and Several Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty Estimates, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 265 (Hans
Joachim Schellnhuber et al. eds., 2006).
" Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions,
106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ScI. 1704, 1704 (2009). For an overview of recent scientific developments, see Michael D. Lemonick, As Effects of Warming Grow, U.N. Report Is Quickly Dated,
YALE ENV'T 360, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.e360.yale.edu/content/print.msp?id=2120 (on file
with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
78 Emissions over the last several years have increased at rates depicted by the very aggressive IPCC A1F1 scenario. See Hepburn & Stem, supra note 76, at 265. Additionally,
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs are increasing faster than many models predict. See Peter Tans, Earth System Research Laboratory, Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Global (2008), availableat http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/index.html#global.
" See Julienne Stroeve et al., Arctic Sea Ice Extent Plummets in 2007, 89 Eos 13 (2008).
81 See Lemonick, supra note 77, at 2.
81 See Timothy M. Lenton et al., Tipping Elements in the Earth's Climate System, 105

PRoC. NAT L ACAD. SCI. 1786, 1789 (2008) (discussing loss of ice); Andrew Shepherd &
Duncan Wingham, Recent Sea-Level Contributions of the Antarctic and Greenland Ice Sheets,
315 SCIENCE 1529 (2007) (regarding Greenland and Antarctic ice); Tad Pfeffer et al., Kinematic Constraintson Glacier Contributionsto 21st-Century Sea Level Rise, 321 SCIENCE 1340
(2008) (regarding sea level rise within 100 years); David M. Lawrence et al., Accelerated
Arctic Land Warming and Permafrost DegradationDuring Rapid Sea Ice Loss, GEOPHYSICAL
REs. LETrERS (March 7, 2008) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (referring to 100 year time span).
82 See Eric Rignot et al., Letter, Recent Antarctic Ice Mass Loss from RadarInterferome-

try and Regional Climate Modelling, 1 NATURE

GEOSCIENCE

106, 106-07 (2008); see also Eric

J. Steig et al., Letter, Warming of the Antarctic Ice-Sheet Surface Since the 1957 International
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duced a number of scholars to call for atmospheric targets of 450 ppm
CO 2 eq or below and temperature targets of 2'C or below. 3 As with the

thick tail debate, these developments raise questions about the atmospheric
target assumptions embedded in the proposed policy architectures.
2.

Technological and Market Assumptions

Even if we assume that 550 ppm CO 2eq (or roughly a 3°C temperature
increase) is an adequate goal, the costs and viability of achieving this goal
with conventional measures are daunting. For example, even if AR4 Category II or IV levels of emissions reductions are acceptable, the cost estimates of achieving those reductions rely on very favorable assumptions.
The models tend to assume no transaction costs, transparent markets, and
perfect implementation of policy measures until 2100. 4 According to the
AR4, "[r]elaxation of these modeling assumptions... will lead to an appreciable increase in all cost categories."85
The models evaluated by the IPCC not only assume no transaction or
adoption costs and perfect markets, but also rapid development and deploy-6

ment of new technologies, including carbon capture and storage ("CCS").8
According to Stem, given the difficulty of reducing agricultural emissions,

and the likelihood that richer nations will need to make greater cuts than

poorer ones, the richer nations may need to achieve near-zero carbon emissions from the transportation and power sectors, which would require "radical" technological changes and "an end to deforestation. 8 7 Some scenarios

for achieving 60 to 80% CO 2 emissions reductions by 2050 assume improvements in energy intensity and carbon intensity of roughly three times current
levels.88 The IPCC concludes that "technology and technological change

Geophysical Year, 457 NATURE 459, 460 (2009) (reporting that new Antarctic temperature
model, using more data sources and improved statistical methods, demonstrates "more signifithan reported in some previous [temperature]
cant temperature change in Antarctica ...
reconstructions").
83 Drawing in part on scientific studies available after the IPCC AR4, the 2008 Garnaut
Report, which was commissioned by the Australian government, suggests that Australia pursue
an atmospheric target of 450 ppm CO 2eq. See GARNAUT, supra note 7, at 268-72 (concluding
that 450 ppm CO 2eq is justified by several cost-benefit analyses). Stem has advocated 500
ppm CO 2eq. Hepburn & Stem, supra note 76, at 277. Hansen has argued that, based on the
current science, 2°C is too high if the goal is to reduce the risk of substantial long-term sea
level increases, and that we have already exceeded the desired atmospheric GHG concentrations. See James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric C0 2: Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2
OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 217-18, 226 (2008); see also James Hansen et al., Dangerous
Human-Made Interference with Climate: A GISS ModelE Study, 7 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY
& PHYSICS 2287, 2304-08 (2007).
88 IPCC AR4 WG l, supra note 7, at 204.
5 Id.
86

Id. at 202-03.

87

Stem, supra note 7, at 7-8.

1 IPCC AR4 WG II, supra note 7, at 216 (citing

REINA KAWASE ET AL., NATYL INST. FOR
ENVTL. STuDIES, JAPAN, CGER-D038-2006, GR.ENHOUSE GAS EMISSION SCENARIOS
DATABASE AND REGIONAL MrTGATION ANALYSIS (2006)). According to the IPCC, "[m]ost
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offer the main possibilities for reducing future emissions and achieving the
eventual stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of GHGs .
"..."89
Assuming a substantial amount of technological development is plausible and is a common strategy. For example, the Pacala and Socolow stabilization wedge strategy suggests that emissions can be leveled off in the near
term with vigorous deployment and development of currently available technologies, and they suggest that their wedges will buy time for the development of new technologies that can begin steep reductions by 2050. 90 The
new technologies must provide energy to both buildings and transport with
near-zero carbon emissions, however, and must do so at prices and with
other characteristics that induce prompt and widespread uptake in developed
and developing countries. Pacala and Socolow describe the necessary new
technologies as "revolutionary." 91
Stem has suggested that even just to achieve 50% global reductions by
2050, "richer countries will need to have close to zero emissions in power
(electricity) and transport .... "92 "IR]adical changes to the source and use
of energy, including much greater energy efficiency," would be required to
achieve these reductions. 93 Even the Stem Report, which was criticized for
being too aggressive in its recommendations for emissions reductions and
too optimistic about the costs of mitigation, rejected modeling the costs of
achieving concentrations below 450 ppm CO 2eq, not because these reductions were unnecessary to achieve the 2°C target, but because they were
9' 4
viewed to be "excessively difficult and costly.
According to the IPCC, the assumptions necessary to achieve AR4 Category I atmospheric concentrations and temperature levels, which are likely
to result in temperature increases close to 2°C, are extreme. Most scenarios
that achieve Category I levels begin emissions reductions before 201591 and
reduce total global emissions by 50 to 85% from 2000 levels by 2050.96 The
IPCC AR4 analysis suggests that to achieve 450 ppm CO 2eq levels, industrialized countries would need to make 25 to 40% cuts in GHGs below 1990
levels by 2020, and 80 to 95% cuts by 2050. 97 Latin America, East Asia
(including China), and the Middle East would need to make substantial reductions in emissions growth by 2020. South Asia (including India) and

of the scenarios with drastic C02 reductions for the USA and the UK assume the introduction
of CCS." Id. at 217.

9
Id. at 218.
9 Stephen Pacala & Robert Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem
for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCENCE 968, 968-69 (2004).

9' Id. at 968 (concluding that "revolutionary technologies" need to be developed to
achieve reductions above leveling off emissions growth).
92
93

Hepburn & Stem, supra note 76, at 264.
Id.

94 Id.

at 263.
9 IIPCC AR4 WG HI, supra note 7, at 199.
I Stem estimates that cuts of 70% are necessary to achieve stabilization at 450ppm
Id.
CO 2eq. Stem, supra note 7, at 7.
1 Hare, supra note 62, at 28.
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Africa would not need to make substantial reductions in emissions growth.
All regions would have to halt emissions growth by 2050.98
In addition, a target of 400 ppm CO 2 eq will provide more comfort that
the 2°C threshold will not be exceeded, but according to one estimate it will
require near-zero worldwide carbon emissions between 2050 and 2100, and
negative emissions (removal of GHGs from the atmosphere) in the last quarter of the century (e.g., through biomass energy capture and storage). 99
Other recent scenarios that achieve 400 ppm CO 2eq'0° require 60 to 70%
CO 2 reductions from 1990 levels by 2050, and 40 to 60% total global GHG
cuts by 2050. All have negative CO 2 emissions in the second half of the
century.10
We do not know what achieving stabilization at or below 2°C would
cost. Few cost estimates of Category I emissions reductions have been prepared, and the cost estimates that have been prepared tend to assume low
baseline emissions levels that appear unrealistic given the recent global
emissions growth. 02 We do know that, according to the IPCC, "[t]he attainability of such low [Category 1] targets is shown to depend on: 1) using
a wide range of different reduction options; and 2) the technology 'readiness'
of advanced technologies, in particular the combination of bio-energy, carbon capture and geologic storage (BECCS)."' 103 The IPCC also states that
"[a]chieving these low-emission trajectories requires a comprehensive
global mitigation effort, including a further tightening of existing climate
policies in Annex I countries, and simultaneous emission mitigation in developing countries, where most of the increase in emissions is expected in
the coming decades."'l 4 Not surprisingly, Bosetti et al. conclude that "more
drastic measures" than the current proposed policy architectures would be
required to meet the 2°C goal. 05
Of course, one or more near-miraculous technological developments
could achieve atmospheric concentrations at 450 ppm CO 2eq or below and
increase the likelihood that temperature increases will not exceed 20C. But
these technologies would need to provide energy for transport and buildings
with almost no net carbon emissions. Perhaps it is not surprising that schol98

Id.

at 29.

99 Id. at 23-25.
'o Id.at 26. Hare describes 450 ppm CO 2eq as "far higher" than the atmospheric stabilization concentrations necessary to achieve a high likelihood of limiting warming to 2°C or
less. Id.at 28.
10l Id.at 26.
"o By making optimistic assumptions about baselines, some cost estimates project GDP
losses by 2030 of only 3% or less, with a 2050 GDP loss that is generally less than 5.5%.
IPCC AR4 WG 1I, supra note 7, at 205-06. The Stem Review cost estimate for roughly the
same atmospheric concentration was for a GDP loss of between -2% and +5%. Id. at 206.
Too few assessments have been done of Category I costs in 2100 for analysis by the IPCC in
AR4. 3Id. at 205-06.
10 Id. at 198.
104Id.at 199.
1o Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at 20 (concluding that "the 2'C temperature target as
envisaged by the IPCC and the European Commission requires more drastic measures than
those indicated in all the policy architectures considered in this paper").
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ars use terms like "drastic,"' 6 "revolutionary,"' °7 and "radical"' 0 8 to describe the technological developments necessary to achieve emissions
reduction levels that are likely to achieve the 2°C goal. In our view, although the development and deployment of such technologies is not impossible, it is not prudent to develop a policy that will fail if the technological
change does not occur as rapidly as assumed.
3.

Incentive Creation Through Emissions Allocations and Deadlines

To be plausible, any proposed policy architecture must identify allocations of benefits and burdens that will achieve a viable international agreement. One means of inducing developing countries to sign on to an
agreement is to provide them with incentives through excess emissions allowances, extended compliance deadlines, or side payments in the form of
cash, technology transfers, or other means. Yet given the global emissions
reductions that are necessary even to achieve a 3°C temperature target, the
ability to provide incentives in the form of excess allowances and extended
compliance deadlines is limited." °9 A brief review of per-capita and percountry emissions suggests that the proposed policy architectures include
very optimistic assumptions about the incentives of the major emitting
countries.
a. Per Capita Analysis
A first test of the plausibility of current proposals to address poverty
and catastrophic climate change is a per capita analysis. To achieve roughly
550 ppm CO 2eq (which would still result in temperatures that are more
likely to result in a temperature increase of roughly 3°C than 2C), if in 2050
the world's population is 9 billion (as expected), global annual per capita
emissions would need to be reduced by 50%, to roughly two tons of CO 2eq
per person." 0 The reductions necessary to get to a two ton per capita level
are all the more daunting because they must take place against a baseline of
doubling under business as usual assumptions."'
The two ton per capita level would require massive reductions in developed countries, which now have far higher per capita emissions. For example, the United States is at roughly twenty tons of CO 2eq per capita today,
suggesting that a 90% reduction in per capita emissions would be necessary
10 Id.

to? Pacala & Socolow, supra note 90, at 968.
'

Hepburn & Stem, supra note 76, at 264.

Stem has recognized the difficulty of providing sufficient over-allocation of allowances to developing countries. Stem, supra note 7, at 31.
Ho See, e.g., id. at 28; see also GARNAUT, supra note 7, at 202-03; Posner & Sunstein, Per
Capita, supra note 18, at 52-53 (noting the importance of per capita analyses in climate negotiations); Vandenbergh, supra note 22, at 916-17 (noting that "the 2050 target will require
global per capita emissions to be far below current Chinese levels").
I See, e.g., Pacala & Socolow, supra note 90, at 969 fig. I (identifying business-as-usual
emissions projections for 2050).
'o
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by 2050 if the target is two tons per capita. Japan and Europe are in the ten
ton range now, suggesting the need for an 80% reduction.11 2 As we note
above, emissions reductions of these levels would require near-zero emissions from buildings and transportation unless substantial reductions are
achieved from other sectors." 3
The two ton per capita limit also casts doubt on the political viability of
proposed architectures that would enable economic growth via substantial
per capita emissions growth in developing countries. To get a sense of the
challenge of achieving the two ton level, per capita emissions will need to be
one-half to one-third of current Chinese emissions, and about equal to current Indian emissions." 4 China alone has accounted for two-thirds of the
growth in world carbon emissions since 2000 and is expected to grow substantially on an aggregate and per capita basis." 5 China is now the largest
economic
GHG-emitting nation, and it recently reiterated its position1 that
6
growth is a higher priority than GHG emissions reductions.
The prospects that China, with roughly 36% of its population living on
less than two dollars per day (a figure close to the World Bank poverty
line)," 7 will commit to and comply with an agreement obligating it to reduce
GHG emissions by half by 2050 are vanishingly small at this point.",8 Similarly, it is difficult to imagine that India will commit to no growth in per
capita GHG emissions by 2050, particularly given that roughly 76% of its
population is living on two dollars or less per day." 9 We discuss the poverty
issue in more detail below, but even in the absence of poverty issues, the
prospects for inducing China, India, and other developing countries to perceive these targets as in their interest are limited.
b.

Major Emitting Countries

A second approach to evaluating the plausibility of proposed architectures is to simplify the analysis by focusing on the largest emitting countries
to understand the extent of the emissions reductions necessary from the major players. Table 2 identifies the fifteen largest emitting countries in 2005
in terms of total GHG emissions. The list of fifteen leading emitters in-

12

Stem, supra note 7, at 29.

113Id. at 7-9.
4

See id. at 28.
1d. at 4-5.
116Dean Scott, China: Top PriorityRemains Economic Growth, Not Curbing Emissions,
Ambassador Says, 40 Env't Rep. (BNA) 326 (2009).
"

117WORLD BANK, POVERTY DATA: A SUPPLEMENT TO WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

2008, at 19 tbl.S.2 (2008), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/
Resources/WDI08supplementl 216.pdf.
118 Posner and Sunstein have noted the importance of addressing the equity arguments of
poor countries in efforts to induce them to enter into a post-Kyoto treaty with substantial,
binding commitments. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1608.
119 WORLD BANK, supra note 117, at 19 tbl.S.2.
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cludes five20 developing countries: China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and
Indonesia. 1
TABLE
Total
CO2
Rank

2.

Country

1

China

2

United States

3

Russian Federation

4

India
Japan
Brazil
Germany
Canada
United Kingdom

European Union

5

6
7

8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15

Mexico
Indonesia
Italy

Korea (South)
France

Iran

TOTAL

GHG

EMISSIONS

MtCO2
7,250
7,098
5,342
1,992
1,863
1,383
1,028
1,006
736
683
641
598
588
588
576
571

(2005)121

% of
World
Total
18.7%
18.3%
13.8%
5.1%
4.8%
3.6%
2.7%
2.6%
1.9%
1.8%
1.7%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5%

Tons of
CO 2 Per
Person

Per
Capita
Rank

5.6

71
8

23.9
10.9
13.9
1.7
10.8

5.5
12.2
22.8
11.3
6.2
2.7
10
12.2
9.5
8.3

19
120
39
73
30
9
36
64
100
44
31
45
54

*Includes CO 2, CH 4 , N2 0, PFCs, HFCs, SF 6 , and international bunkers; excludes land-use change

120 We refer to China as a developing country in this Article, although we recognize that
China and several other developing countries are rapidly industrializing. See, e.g., Stem,
supra note 7, at 22 (discussing China as a part of the "developing world"); Posner & Sunstein,
Per Capita, supra note 18, at 54 (noting that China, India, and Brazil are "developing countries that are, or will soon be, industrial powers"). The totals exclude emissions from land use
and forestry, for which only data from 2000 are available and the reliability of the data is
unclear. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC") has
cautioned that "[p]arties reported difficulties in obtaining activity data for the time series
needed for the LUCF sector, as requested by the IPCC methodology. National data on land
use and forest cover were often outdated or not in a suitable format." UNFCCC, Subsidiary
Body for Implementation, Sixth Compilation and Synthesis of Initial Communications from
PartiesNot Included in Annex I to the Convention, 87, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBI/2005/18 (Oct.
25, 2005), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/sbi/eng/18.pdf. Nevertheless, it is
clear that Indonesia and Brazil accounted for a large share of global land-use carbon emissions. See Richard Houghton, Data Note, Emissions (and Sinks) of Carbon from Land-Use
Change 1 (Report to the World Resources Institute from the Woods Hole Research Center,
2003), available at http://cait.wri.org/downloads/DN-LUCF.pdf. For an analysis for major
emitting countries, see Sunstein, supra note 3.
...
WRI-CAIT, supra note 16. The WRI-CAIT data include and rank the European Union
("EU") for comparison purposes. Since other EU member countries are ranked as well, we
have removed the EU ranking and adjusted the rankings of the other countries to reflect this
change.
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The five largest emitters among the developing countries (China, India,
Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia) account for almost 30% of the GHG emissions from all countries. These five developing countries also have projected emissions growth rates that are among the steepest of all major
emitters. For example, the International Energy Agency ("lEA") predicts
that the energy-related emissions in the business as usual case will be 225%
larger for China in 2030, 190% for India, 177% for Brazil, 172% for Mexico, and 190% for Indonesia.'22 In fact, 97% of the increase in global energy-related CO 2 emissions is expected to arise from countries that are not
among the industrialized countries that comprise the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD").'23 To achieve a global
50% emissions reduction when five of the top fifteen countries have steep
growth rates will require extraordinary reductions from business as usual
levels.
c.

Major Emitting Sectors

A third test of intuitive plausibility focuses on the categories of source
types, rather than national per capita or aggregate emissions. The problem
with the scope of the needed reductions from developing countries is confounded by the fact that the emissions categories above exclude GHG emissions from agriculture, forestry, and other land use changes, which make up
a large share of the emissions from these five countries. Data presented in
Figure 1 on emissions sources demonstrate the importance of these source
categories.

122

See ENERGY

INFO. ADMIN.,

U.S.

DEP'r OF ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK

2008, at 93 fig.77 (Mexico), 94 fig.79 (Asian countries) (2008). All data are country-specific,
except for Indonesia, which reflects "Other Asia."
123INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2008 FACT SHEET: GLOBAL ENERGY TRENDS (2008), available at http://www.worldenergyouttook.org/docs/weo2008/factsheets_08.pdf. As Posner and Sunstein note based on country-level GHG data, "[iut should be
clear, from these figures, why developing countries are most unlikely to be sympathetic to an
approach that allocates emissions rights on the basis of existing emissions levels." Posner &
Sunstein, Per Capita, supra note 18, at 61.
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FIGURE

1. 2004

CO 2EQ EMIssIoNs BY SECTOR

Waste and
wastewater
(2.8%)

327

124

Forestry
(17.4%)

Energy SupplyL

(25.9%)

-Agriculture
T(13.5%)
(13.1%)

Residential and
commercial
buildings (7.9%)

-

i
Industry
(19.4%)

Much of the focus of emissions reduction strategies to date has been on
industry, energy supply, and transport, which comprise roughly two-thirds of
all 2004 CO 2 eq emissions. According to the IPCC data presented in Figure
1, however, agriculture and forestry emissions contributed roughly 30% of
global emissions in 2004.125 These emissions arise from agricultural practices and deforestation in developed and developing countries. Deforestation is a particular concern in Brazil, Indonesia, and several other developing
countries. Forestry and agricultural emissions are influenced not only by
practices in developing countries but also by consumption patterns in developed countries.12 6 Individual and household emissions are distributed among
the energy supply, buildings, and transport sectors on Figure 1, but they, too,

124IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 29 fig.TS.2b.
125Id.; William Boyd, International Forest Carbon and Climate Governance: Current
Status and Prospects, in DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE: REDUCING CARBON EMIsSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION (Valentina Bosetti et al. eds., forth-

coming 2010) (manuscript at 1, on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (noting
"mounting evidence that we cannot stabilize atmospheric CO 2 at a safe level without addressing emissions from the forest sector").
126See Thomas Wiedmann et al., Examining the Global Environmental Impact of Regional Consumption Activities - Part2: Review of Input-Output Models for the Assessment of
Environmental Impacts Embodied in Trade, 61 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1, 15-16 (2007).
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are likely to be important, and recent studies of black carbon or soot7 suggest
that they may be far more important than previously recognized.'
Even putting aside the black carbon emissions from the household sector, achieving global GHG reductions of 50% or more will be very difficult
if agriculture, forestry, and other land uses are not included in the remedial
measures. Given that agriculture and forestry comprise over 30% of the
total, achieving emissions reductions in the 80% or greater range may be
impossible without reductions from these sectors.' 28 At the same time, emissions associated with these sectors are often omitted from climate policy
architectures.'29
4.

Poverty Alleviation

A fourth test of the plausibility of proposed policy architectures is to
examine the means by which they address poverty alleviation. As discussed
above, the five largest GHG-emitting developing countries are critical to the
success of any climate policy architecture. All have large populations in
poverty. According to World Bank data, the percentage of individuals living
on less than two dollars a day are 36% in China, 76% in India, 18% in
Brazil, 54% in Indonesia, and 5% in Mexico. 30 It is unlikely that these
countries will agree to carbon emissions that make poverty worse, and inducing their participation in a climate change agreement may require a reasonable prospect that some measure of poverty alleviation will occur. In
short, there will be no solution to climate change without these major developing nations, and little chance of participation by them without the prospect
for substantial poverty alleviation.'
A common approach is convergence: the rich countries contribute to
the economic development of the poor countries to enable the two groups to
converge on some intermediate level of capita emissions. But if the two ton
per capita emissions level is to be achieved by 2050, the convergence must
occur quickly. It also must be followed by prompt joint reductions at remarkable levels.
127See

Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-NeutralIndividual,

82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1673, 1691-95 (2007); V. Ramanathan & G. Carmichael, Global and
Regional Climate Changes Due to Black Carbon, 1 NATuE GEOSCIENCE 221, 221-22 (2008)
(noting that black carbon, or soot, is emitted from cooking and crop residue burning, and
concluding that emissions of black carbon result in 55% of the radiative forcing of CO 2 and
contribute more forcing than any GHG other than C0 2); see also Elisabeth Rosenthal, Soot
from Third-World Stoves Is New Target in Climate Fight, N.Y. Tiams, Apr. 16, 2009, at Al
(noting that black carbon is second only to CO 2 in its global warming effects).
128See Stem, supra note 7, at 7.
129See, e.g., Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at 6-7 (discussing cap and trade scheme without
REDD).

130 WORLD BANK, supra note 117, at 19-20 tbl.S.2.
31 If global emissions must be reduced by 50% or more, the rest of the world would have

to approach zero emissions just to allow these five developing countries, which currently emit
nearly 30% of total emissions, to continue to emit at current levels, much less increase emissions to fuel economic growth. See WRI-CAIT, supra note 16.

20091 Vandenbergh et al., Micro-Offsets & Macro-Transformation

329

A second approach is to assume that emissions reductions should not
prevent increases in per capita income up to some minimum level. An example is the GDR approach developed by EcoEquity and the Stockholm
Environment Institute, which excludes populations in any country below
$7500 in per capita income from calculations of responsibility and capacity
for emissions reductions. Excluding these populations, however, may miss
opportunities for initiatives that reduce emissions and enhance the well-being of people in poverty. For example, switching to improved cook stoves
will reduce black soot emissions and ill-health effects. Similarly, enabling
increases in income to the $7500 level without attending to GHG emissions
effects may lead to substantial new GHG emissions from increased production and consumption of consumer goods.
Is it possible to alleviate poverty by increasing per capita income with-

out exceeding climate targets? We examined recent trends in China and India to provide an initial insight into changes in energy-using behavior as
incomes increase. In particular, we reviewed recent appliance adoption and
usage rates in developing countries for individuals with increased incomes to
create a mix of items that many households in developing countries have
acquired given the economic wherewithal and access to electricity (see Table
3). In China, these included lights, TVs, washers, fans, DVD players, and
refrigerators.132 Indian households have readily adopted lights and fans, then
opted for TVs, refrigerators, and water heaters.' 33 Studies suggest that even
a small increase in household income can have a significant impact: an urban Indian household whose monthly spending power increases from 300
rupees ($6 USD) to 600 rupees ($12 USD) goes from a 50% likelihood to a
100% likelihood of owning a fan, and from a 25% to a 50% likelihood of
owning a TV; at 1700 rupees ($33 USD) per month, half of these households
also have a refrigerator.134 We do not claim that increases in per capita in132 On average, 420 lights, 102 color TVs, 64 washers, 59 fans, 44 DVD players, and 28
refrigerators were owned for every 100 households in China in 2005. He Yongxiu et al.,
Residential Load Forecast in China 688 tbl.2 (2007) (Eighth International Power Engineering
Conference), available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=4510114&isnumber=4509990.
133VIRGINIE E. LETSCHERT & MICHAEL A. McNEiL, COPING WTH REsIDENTIAL ELECTRICrrY DEMAND IN INDIA'S FuTuRE 6 figs.3 & 4 (2007), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ies/
iespubs/63199.pdf. A study of older data showed similar statistics, including those for lighting. See Rangan Banerjee et al., Electricity Demandfor Village Electrification2 tbl. 1, 3 fig.2
(proceedings of National Renewable Energy Conference, ITT Bombay, 2000), available at
http://www.me.iitb.ac.in/-rangan/publication/PapersProceedings/nrecpaper2.pdf.
11 LETSCHERT & McNEIL, supra note 133, at 6 fig.3 (estimates from graph). Note that
though adopting TVs before more utilitarian appliances may seem counterintuitive, this consumption pattern is common. See Zhao Rong & Yang Yao, Public Service Provision and the
Demandfor ElectricAppliances in Rural China, 14 CHINA ECON. REv. 131, 131 (2003); see
also Michael Sivak, Potential Energy Demandfor Cooling in the 50 Largest Metropolitan
Areas of the World: Implicationsfor Developing Countries, 37 ENERGY POL'Y 1382, 1382-83
(2009) (noting that "increasing personal income is likely to lead to an unprecedented increase
in energy demand in many developing countries. For example, the potential cooling demand
in metropolitan Mumbai [a city with 18.2 million people] is about 24% of the demand for the
entire United States").
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come in the future will generate the same pattern of consumer behavior as
has occurred recently in China and India, or that individuals in China and
India have a lesser right to a television or refrigerator than people in developed countries. Rather, we point out that if income growth has the effect it
has had recently in China and India, substantial increases in GHG emissions
will occur, and these increases need to be accounted for in policy
architectures.
TABLE

3: A

SAMPLE OF COMMON RESIDENTIAL APPLIANCES IN

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Apine

Appliance

Avg. Hours

Months

Watts

per day

per year
in-use

per
Hour

Qty

135

Total

Annual

MtCO 2 at

kWh per
Year

MBtI

present
intensity

MtCO2 at

future
intensity

Most prolific appliances
Fluorescent light bulb

5.5

12

15

3

90

0.3

0.15

0.13

Fan
Color TV
Refrigerator
Mobile phone charger
Total

10.0
6.4
24.0
3.5

12
12
12
12

80
125
100
7

1
1

292
288
359
9
1038

1.0
1.0
1.2
0.0
3.5

0.49
0.48
0.60
0.01
1.73

0.43
0.43
0.53
0.01
1.54

1
1

The World Bank estimates that 2.6 billion people are living on less than
$2 per day, 136 which we estimate to constitute roughly 530 million households.137 If each of these households were to adopt the items in the sample

basket of appliances identified in Table 3, the result would be an additional
35Estimated use based on data from the studies in LETSCHERT & McNER, supra note
133, as well as R. Saidur et al., Energy and Associated Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
Household Appliances in Malaysia, 35 ENERGY POL'Y 1648, 1650 tbls.1 & 2 (2007). Power
demand for appliances was also calculated based on a sample of appliances available at
Compare India, http://Comparelndia.in.com/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2009) (on file with Harvard
Environmental Law Review). For a recent study of CO 2 emissions from consumption in
China, see Glen P. Peters et al., China's Growing C0 2 Emissions - A Race Between
Increasing Consumption and Efficiency Gains, 41 ENVTL. SCI. & ThCH. 5939, 5940 (2007)
(concluding that Chinese CO 2 emissions from urban households and other consumption have
outpaced
gains from efficiency).
136 WORLD BANK, supra note 117, at II tbl.3.
'37 The total of 530 million households is based on population figures in WORLD BANK,
supra note 117. A regionally-weighted average family size of 4.84 was calculated using statistics for China, India, and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, which represent the majority of populations living on less than $2 per day. The totals on a per-country basis include China, estimated
median household size of 3.7, based on a 2002 average of rural and urban households. ALJ3ERTO NOGALES, WORLD BANK, CHINA: TRANSPORT SECTOR BRIEF, at app. "Transport Sector
Measures" (2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/transport/transportresults/regions/
eap/eap-china-output.pdf. India has an estimated median household size of 5.8, using
"demographics of the poor." Rinku Murgai & Martin Ravallion, Is a Guaranteed Living
Wage a Good Anti-Poverty Policy? 13 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, WPS
3640, 2005), availableat http://www-wds.worldbank.org/extemal/defaultlWDSContentServer/
IW3P/IB/2005/06/16/000016406_20050616103635/Rendered/PDF/wps3640.pdf. Zambia has
an estimated median household size of 5.3 and was used as a substitute for much of subSaharan Africa. WORLD BANK, REPORT No. 32573-ZM, ZAMBIA POVERTY AND VULNERABIL-

rrv AssEssMENT 68 tbl.3.1 (2007), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/extemal/de-
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550 terawatt hours of energy demand, and 814 MMtCO 2 of expected carbon
emissions. 3 This is not a normative statement about whether such consumption is unjust by some global measure; by comparison, electricity consumption in U.S. residences totaled 904 MMtCO 2 in 2007.139
The implication is that we cannot ignore the need to focus on how those
in developing countries can achieve commensurate levels of well-being
through activities that generate substantially less GHG emissions. The total
new emissions from the sample basket of appliances represent 4% of the
allowable global emissions in 2050 if we assume that global emissions must
be reduced by 50% from year 2000 levels. 14° As an independent country,
this would be the eighth largest polluter, ahead of Canada.14 1 Thus, if per
capita income generates comparable increases in purchases of consumer
goods to those that have occurred in China and India in recent years, in the
absence of major technological advances, the result will be a major new
source of GHG emissions.
5.

Summary

To summarize the argument thus far, the conventional approaches to
climate change and poverty make one or more of the following assumptions:
(1) emissions reductions can be set at levels that will generate a high likelihood that the 2°C temperature target will not be met; (2) revolutionary technologies can be developed and deployed that will dramatically reduce
emissions; (3) governance measures can direct limited attention to the agriculture, forestry, land use, and individual and household sectors; (4) developing countries can be induced to participate through emissions targets that
are lenient and that do not require reductions from business as usual for
many decades; and (5) poverty concerns can be addressed through incentives
that will increase per capita income. To protect against the substantial chance
that one or more of these assumptions turns out to be unfounded, we suggest
that the conservative approach is to use near-term reductions to buy time not
only for technological change, but also for the development of more transformative policy architectures and initiatives.
faultIWDSContentServerWDSP/IB/2007/10/04/000020439_20071004094458/Rendered/PDF/
325730ZM.pdf.
'38 Emissions intensity of 1.48 metric tons of CO 2 per MW based on an average of future
energy intensity in China (1.45 metric tons of CO 2 per MW) and India (1.51 metric tons of
CO 2 per MW) using data from Carbon Monitoring for Action ("CARMA"), http://carma.org/
dig (last visited Apr. 26, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
CARMA data were converted at a rate of 0.907 metric tons per short ton.
'39 According to the EIA Emissions of Greenhouse Gases Report, electricity, as a subset

of residential sector energy consumption, accounted for the emission of 903.7 metric tons of
carbon dioxide in the United States in 2007. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES REPORT (2008), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/carbon.html#residential
(on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
"0 Percentage figure based on a global total of 38,984.6 MMtCO 2 for the year 2000,
which excludes land-use change. See WRI-CAIT, supra note 16.
141 Id.
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A DIERENT PATH

Many questions arise if the policy architecture must address climate
change and social justice without the aggressive assumptions that are explicit or implicit in current proposed architectures. We do not have answers
to these questions, but we offer proposed core characteristics to set the landscape for the debate. We also identify examples of policy initiatives that
demonstrate the direction that a more transformative approach may take.
Governments may decide that the fundamental changes necessary to achieve
the 2°C temperature target are not worth the cost, or they may be unwilling
or unable to develop a policy architecture that is politically acceptable, but
these decisions should be based on informed politics.
A.

Core Characteristics

We begin by proposing a number of core characteristics of macro-transformation and then turn to examples of the types of initiatives that new policy architectures should seek to promote. These characteristics are not
meant to displace the widely adopted notions that the climate policy architecture should be just, "scientifically sound, economically rational, and po' 42

litically pragmatic.'
Priorityand Urgency. At the outset, scholars and policymakers should
give development of transformative policy architectures the priority and urgency suggested by the analysis in Part I. The development of these policy
architectures will take years and will involve difficult local, national, and
global discussions. In addition, lock-in effects will occur in the meantime.
Every new World Bank-subsidized coal-fired power plant, even if it is more
efficient than other coal-fired plants, locks in many decades of GHG emissions, reduces incentives to sign on to a post-Kyoto treaty, induces greater
demand for electricity, and, by providing cheap but dirty energy, undermines
incentives for development and deployment of alternative sources of energy
and less energy-intensive development paths. 43 The longer we wait, the
more these lock-in effects will occur.' 44
142Aldy & Stavins, supra note 2, at 1.
143See, e.g., Lesley Wroughton, World Bank Approves Fundsfor Coal-FiredPower Plant,
REUTERS ALERTNET, Apr. 8, 2008, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N08412737.
htm (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (discussing International Finance
Corporation ("IFC") funding of the Ultra Mega plant, and noting that it will be more efficient
than many coal-fired power plants in India); Dot Earth, Money for India's "Ultra Mega" Coal
Plants Approved, http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/09/money-for-indias-ultra-megacoal-plants-approved/ (Apr. 9, 2008) (noting that the Ultra Mega plant will emit 23 million
tons of CO 2 per year, but that "[tihe I.F.C., along with the Asian Development Bank, Korea,
and other backers, sees the need to bring electricity to one of the world's poorest regions as
more pressing than limiting carbon dioxide from fuel burning").
I" In addition, if developing countries achieve poverty alleviation using the fossil-fuel
intensive path taken by developed countries, when they turn to calculate the costs and benefits
of making emissions reductions several decades down the road, the costs will be much higher
than if the lock-in effects were minimized along the way.
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Transfonnation. Despite the magnitude of the challenge, scholars and
policymakers should not shy away from proposing transformative architectures and initiatives. Successful new approaches are unlikely to emerge
from any one discipline; rather, they will require active collaboration among
economists, other social scientists, emissions experts, and law and policy
experts. Part of the answer must be in how the question is framed in the
developing world. If it is "Do we have the same right to fossil-fuel based
industrialization and household consumption that developing countries
had?," it is hard to argue that the answer is no.'45 Public subsidies for coalfired power plants and for inexpensive, efficient, but numerous new motor
vehicles reflect this approach. 46 Yet the approach has the effect of abandoning of the 2°C goal. If the question is framed as "Do you want to make
the same jump to a post-industrial society that the developed countries are
making, and skip the intermediate stage that the developed countries are trying to move away from?," it is likewise harder to argue that the answer is
no.
The problem, of course, is that no one knows whether poverty alleviation and the GHG emissions reductions necessary to attain the 2'C temperature target can be achieved by a leapfrog approach in developing countries.
Can poverty and carbon emissions goals be achieved through combining
large, industrial-scale innovations with small-scale, but widespread, approaches? Can a focus on developing and deploying new and existing technologies reduce the need for major new coal-fired electric power plants?
How can incentives be created for funding small-scale, but widespread, supply and demand solutions, not just conventional, large-scale, energy supply
projects? Can better land use, transportation planning, and technological developments substitute for hundreds of millions of new gas-powered cars in
India? We do not claim to know. We only claim that many current policy
architectures, which appear to assume that developing countries must pass
through the traditional industrialization and consumption stage, have a
troubling likelihood of allowing catastrophic climate change to occur and of
leaving developing countries perpetually behind developed countries. We
argue that more attention should be directed toward developing policy architectures and initiatives that will make the shift from a pre-industrial to a
post-industrial economy possible without a fossil fuel-driven interim stage.
Existing Policy Architectures and Initiatives. Climate policy architectures and initiatives should supplement, not replace, existing public governance measures. Existing and proposed international and regional public
governance schemes (e.g., cap-and-trade schemes and carbon taxes), will
continue to be an essential component of any global GHG emissions strategy. These measures will raise the price of GHG emissions, which will have
145See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1602.
46

See, e.g., Sunita Narain, Editorial, The Right Right, DOWN To EARTH, Apr. 15, 2009,
available at http://www.downtoearth.org.in/editor.asp?foldemame=20090415&filename=Editor&sec id=2&sid= 1 (discussing subsidies for the Nano car and the need to reframe arguments about rights to modem transportation).
'
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important effects in the developed and developing worlds. Although more
transformative steps are needed, the transformative steps will not be a substitute for the conventional approaches, and the need for transformative approaches should not be used to delay or dilute the conventional ones. At the
same time, international, regional, and national cap-and-trade, carbon tax,
and other schemes should not undermine efforts to generate deeper change.
In particular, it is important to recognize that any macro-transformation attempt by a smaller economy could be undermined by actions in large
47
economies. 1
Expanded Portfolio of Architectures and Initiatives. The more trans-

formative approach will require a level of law and policy innovation comparable to the one that occurred two decades ago, launching the current focus
on cap-and-trade and carbon tax solutions. 148 It may be that a single concept
comparable to increasing the price of carbon will emerge to meet this need.
It is also possible that a basket of approaches will be necessary, and that the
only unifying concept will be that emissions that are largely beyond the
reach of carbon prices will be reduced by many of these new approaches.
The GHG emissions problem resembles the sulfur dioxide-driven acid rain
problem in many ways, but GHG emissions are far more deeply entwined
with the full range of consumption and production, and many of these activities are less sensitive to price signals than are sulfur dioxide emissions.
Scholars and policymakers certainly will not be starting from scratch. Evaluation of ongoing efforts within carbon finance markets, especially those
that also include non-carbon social benefits, such as those targeted at "reducing emissions through deforestation and degradation" ("REDD") or
"payment for eco-system services" ("PES"), have taught us a great deal
about how both micro-innovations and macro-transformational initiatives
can succeed and how they can go wrong. 149
Transformative policy architectures also should reflect the need to provide incentives in the developed and developing worlds for changes in consumption patterns. 150 Pricing carbon through a cap-and-trade scheme or a
147For example, according to the World Bank, if measures of poverty took into account
the increase in food prices, global estimates in 2009 "might show a reversal of the steady
decline in poverty rates of the previous few years." For many, the fall below poverty can be
traced to changes in global food prices due to biofuel policies in the United States and Europe.
WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: DEVELOPMENT

IN A CHANGING

CLIMATE: CONCEPT NOTE 6 (2008).

See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985) (proposing a cap-and-trade approach for stationary air pollution
sources).
49
1 See LEO PESKETr ET AL., POVERTY ENVIRONMENT PARTNERSHIP REPORT: MAKING
REDD WORK FOR THE POOR 5 (2008); ARtLD ANGELSEN ET AL., REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM
DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION (REDD): AN OPTIONS ASSESSMENT REPORT
(2009), available at http://www.redd-oar.org/links/REDD-OAR-en.pdf; Larry Lohmann, Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatisation and Power, 48 DEV.
148

DIALOGUE

5 (2006).

"SoSee generally Douglas A. Kysar & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Introduction: Climate
Change and Consumption, 38 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,825
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carbon tax will push incentives in this direction, but price alone may not
affect many types of consumption that are carbon-relevant, such as when an
activity does not involve the transfer of money, when information about how
to save money is unavailable, or when the infrastructure for low-cost, lowemission behaviors does not exist."' Pricing strategies may run into particular limitations in the agriculture, forestry, land use, and individual and
household sectors in both developing and developed countries. In addition,
cap-and-trade schemes should be carefully designed to reduce incentives for
leakage from developed to developing countries as developed world consumption is satisfied by developing world production.'
Studies have
demonstrated significant shifts in the most carbon-intensive production to
developing countries in recent years, and a recent study concluded that
roughly one-third of China's GHG emissions arise from the production of
153
goods for export.
Expanded Portfolio of Sectors and GHGs. The Part I analysis suggests
that the types of sectors that are likely to be only modestly affected by traditional price-based measures (e.g., agriculture, forestry, other land use, and
individuals and households) make up a large share of the total GHG emissions inventory, particularly in developing countries. It may be impossible
to achieve the necessary reductions by 2050 without these sectors, and even
if it is possible to achieve those reductions, it may be more expensive to treat
them as less important than the traditional industrial and transportation
sources. In both developed and developing countries, price-based laws and
policies targeted at large industrial sources and transportation fuels should
be supplemented with approaches that address the non-traditional sectors. In
addition, all six of the GHGs identified in the Kyoto Protocol should be
included in the emissions reduction strategies, and other substances added as
necessary. Many types of GHG emissions other than CO 2 are common from
the sectors that play a strong role in the developing countries. Examples
include emissions from agriculture (e.g., methane and nitrous oxide) and
household cooking and heating (e.g., black carbon).
Poverty Alleviation. The analysis in Part I suggests that poverty alleviation is essential to catastrophic climate change risk reduction. Successful
transformative policy architectures will strive to achieve both of these goals.
Wherever possible, poverty alleviation should be achieved through approaches that reduce GHG emissions, or at worst hold GHG emissions con(2008) (discussing the importance of examining the relationship between consumption and
GHG emissions).
' 'See, e.g., Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 127, at 1715-16 (discussing limits of
price signals on individual environmentally significant behaviors).
52See Vandenbergh, supra note 22, at 911, 945-46.
'53Christopher L. Weber et al., The Contributionof Chinese Exports to Climate Change,
36 ENERGY POLY 3572, 3574 (2008) (estimating that one-third of Chinese CO 2 emissions arise
from production of goods for export); see also Bin Shui & Robert C. Harriss, The Role of CO 2
Embodiment in US-China Trade, 34 ENERGY POL'Y 4063, 4066 (2006) (estimating that Chinese
exports to the United States account for 7 to 14% of Chinese CO 2 emissions from 1997
through 2003).
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stant. Approaches that attempt to alleviate poverty through transfers (or side
payments) rather than structural transformation should be used sparingly,
and only after approaches that consider the relationships among povertyrelated and climate-related behaviors. Both small-scale innovations and
macro-transformations have the potential to affect the structures that perpetuate poverty or to focus merely on redistribution.
Measures of Well-Being. A transformative approach should measure
poverty alleviation not only with traditional per capita income measures, but
also with measures that account for improvements in well-being. The growing literature on happiness and well-being suggests that income has limitations as a proxy for well-being, and that the use of income as a metric may
lead to policies that generate higher levels of GHG emissions than would
occur if broader measures were used. Although increases in income are associated with increases in happiness or well-being at low income levels, the
relationship weakens as income increases, and even for14low-income individuals, income is an incomplete measure of well-being.'
The factors associated with increased well-being that are not captured
by changes in per capita income may be particularly important for joint efforts to alleviate poverty and reduce GHG emissions in developing countries. In developing countries, a larger proportion of consumption and labor
takes place without monetary transfers, making the impact of income on
well-being difficult to measure. For example, when incomes rise through
paid employment, domestic labor burdens shift to those not in the formal
work place. 55 This production includes care work, but also home-based production such as agriculture and rice processing. With such shifts, children
(girls more so than boys) are drawn out of school. The net impact on the
well-being of each family member cannot be measured by the increase in
household income. By contrast, when farmers shift from purchased seeds
and fertilizers to sustainable methods that use composting, health improves
as families are less exposed to fertilizers spread by hand and runoff in their
water supplies. The increases in well-being may not be accounted for in
measures of net income. Studies also indicate that the success of poverty
alleviation initiatives, and thus well-being, is affected by the degree to which
the poor participate in the political and social processes used to develop the

15' See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Consumption, Happiness, and
Climate Change, 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,834, 10,835-37 (2008) (reviewing the
happiness literature); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) (discussing human
capabilities). For a discussion of the multidimensionality of capability and its measurement,
see Sabina Alkire & James Foster, Counting and MultidimensionalPoverty Measurement (Oxford Poverty & Human Dev. Inst., Working Paper No. 7, 2008), available at http://www.ophi.
org.uk/pubs/OPHI WP7.pdf.
'55 The connections between formal and informal labor and well-being have been explored
in a vast literature beginning in the 1980s. See Lourdes Benerfa & Gita Sen, Class and Gender Inequalities and Women's Role in Economic Development: Theoretical and PracticalImplications, 8 FEMINIST STUDIES 157, 160-76 (1982); MARTHA CHEN ET AL., PROGRESS OF THE
WORLD'S WOMEN 2005: WOMEN, WORK AND POVERTY ch. 4 (2005).
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initiatives.'56 Other examples of areas where improvements in well-being
may not be closely associated with increases in income and GHG emissions
15 7
are health, leisure, and education.
Increases in well-being can be either underestimated or overestimated
by focusing exclusively on per capita income. 5 ' Allocations of emissions
reduction benefits and burdens that use per capita income but do not account
for well-being may miss opportunities to account for and stimulate the development of low-GHG initiatives while improving well-being. Allocations
that assume that poverty must be alleviated (and developing countries must
be given incentives) through increased per capita income thus may induce
greater GHG emissions per increase in well-being than allocations that use a
broader metric. In short, transformative approaches are more likely to occur
if changes in well-being arising from non-monetized labor and consumption
are accounted for in climate policy architectures.
We assume that any transformative policy architecture will reflect these
core considerations and will stimulate a wide range of more specific private
and public governance initiatives. Given the importance of the countries and
sectors that will be difficult to include in a more conventional policy architecture, we suggest that scholars and policymakers devote as much time and
effort to developing proposed transformative architectures and initiatives as
they are now giving to the more conventional approaches.
B.

Short-Term Initiatives

To be plausible, any move toward a transformative policy architecture
must be able to point to concrete, feasible initiatives. Although we have
only sketched the initial outlines of a transformative approach, a number of
concrete examples demonstrate that the approach can yield viable initiatives.
In Part II.B, we discuss a near-term, private market initiative, and in Part
II.C we discuss longer-term initiatives. Our proposed private market initiative involves the addition of equity micro-offsets ("EMOs") as an extension
of the growing retail carbon offset market. A few examples of EMOs exist
today, and expansion of the private market for EMOs could result in prompt,
substantial carbon emission reductions while improving the well-being of
the most disadvantaged populations in developed and developing coun-

156Sabina Alkire, Subjective QuantitativeStudies of Human Agency, 74 Soc. INDICATORS
RES. 217 (2005) (offering an empirical approach to the quantitative study of human agency).
57See Cohen & Vandenbergh, supra note 154, at 10,835-37.
'58 The conception of well-being we use is amenable to estimating the monetary equivalence of changes in well-being that are conferred through non-market labor and consumption.
For an example of efforts to improve measures of well-being, see Amartya Sen, Well-Being,
Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures, 82 J. PHIL. 169 (1985) (setting out the importance
of attending to well-being and agency); SA3INA ALKIRE, VALUING FREEDOMS: SEN'S CAPABILrrv APPROACH AND POVERTY REDUCION (2002) (offering an empirical approach to measuring
capability). Our approach could accommodate these efforts but does not depend on them.
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tries. 5 9 By linking the purchasers, developers, principals, and benefactors of
carbon projects with the growing microfinance community, it may be possible to develop a large, active private EMO market. In addition, over the
longer term the private EMO market could be folded into cap-and-trade programs at the national and international levels.
1. Existing Carbon Markets
The size and scope of the existing carbon credit market demonstrates
the potential for EMOs. In 2007, global markets traded nearly 3000 million
metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent ("MMtCO 2eq") credits. 1w Trading
increased to 4000 MMtCO 2 eq in 2008.161 Trading volume includes credits
exchanged multiple times and covers a range of vintages (the year in which
the associated credit was generated), but this figure represents around 10%
anthropogenic sources, recently estimated
of global emissions attributable 1to
62
at 43,000 MMtCO 2eq per year.
Credits are traded for both regulatory compliance and voluntary objectives. Although compliance accounts for the overwhelming majority of activity, voluntary markets are growing dramatically, representing more than
2% of total volume traded in 2007.163 Voluntary transactions take place both
on formal exchanges such as the Chicago Climate Exchange ("CCX") and
over-the-counter ("OTC"). In 2007, roughly 65.0 MMtCO 2eq were exchanged in the voluntary market: 22.9 MMtCO 2eq via the CCX, and 42.1
164
MMtCO 2 eq OTC. These figures correspond to $330.8 million in value.
When a voluntary credit is permanently taken off the market, or "retired," it
effectively functions as a carbon offset. About one-quarter of the credits
traded OTC in 2007 were confirmed as permanent offsets.1 65 In 2007, the
average price for OTC credits sold in the United States (denominated in
short tons instead of metric tons) was $6.10.166
See Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 1, at 75-76 (discussing domestic equity offsets); Ackerly & Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 565 (discussing a global role for equity
offsets).
'60KATHERINE HAMILTON ET AL., TiE KATOOMBA GROUP'S ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE,
FORGING A FRONTIER: STATE OF THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETs 2008, at 7 (2008), available at http://ecosystemmarketplace.com/documents/cms documents/2008_StateofVoluntary
CarbonMarket.4.pdf.
161Press Release, New Carbon Fin., Carbon up 84% in 2008 at $118b (Jan. 8, 2008)
available at http://newcarbonfinance.com/download.php?n=20090108 PRCarbonMarkets_
Q42008.pdf&f=fileName&t=NCF downloads.
162Total is based on 2005, the most recent year with complete data. WRI-CAIT, supra
note 16.
163See HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 160, at 26 tbl.2.
16 Id. The total includes $72.4 million CCX and $258.4 million OTC. Id. Preliminary
data indicate that transactions in the voluntary market rose to $499 million in 2008. Press
Release, New Carbon Fin., supra note 161.
165 Of the 42.1 MMtCO2eq of credits traded on the OTC market in 2007, respondents
were only able to confirm that 10.7 MMtCO2eq were directly destined for retirement. HAMILTON Er AL., supra note 160, at 6.
"6See id. at 29. Prices for carbon credits vary significantly based on the source of emission reduction (e.g. forestation, methane capture, energy efficiency), the standard the credit is
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Several segments of the voluntary carbon market already factor in social justice considerations when developing carbon credits, including the
CDM Gold Standard and Social Carbon. These represent 9% and 2%, respectively, of the voluntary carbon offset market. 67 The CDM Gold Standard ("GS") is a private non-profit group with no official ties to the
UNFCCC Clean Development Mechanism ("CDM"). It functions as a
foundation, a method for developing carbon projects, and as a label that can
be applied to projects adhering to specific guidelines for sustainable development. For example, the GS will award a quality label to a UNFCCCsanctioned CDM project that meets specific criteria and goes through the GS
certification process. The GS also certifies voluntary credits developed using its methodology. The GS gives explicit consideration to sustainability
68
issues as part of the certification process.
Social Carbon is a second private standard that accounts for social justice. Its methodology involves a community-level assessment of six resource classes: carbon, biodiversity, social, financial, human, and natural. 16 9
To measure and continually improve overall sustainability, Social Carbon
rates the impact on each of these resources on a scale of one to six every
70
year over the life of the project.
Both the CDM Gold Standard and Social Carbon credits command a
substantial premium in the market. For example, in 2007 and 2008, Gold
Standard credits sold for more than twice the price of the average voluntary
carbon credit.' 7' Although further study will be required to establish the
causes of the price premium, the premium may indicate that buyers place a
substantial value on offsets that address social justice issues as well as GHG
emissions. Buyers also may believe that these credits and their standards
have a greater likelihood of being incorporated into future compliance
72
markets.

based on (e.g. CDM VER, VCS, etc.), as well as normal supply/demand dynamics. A participant's position in the supply chain (e.g. developer, wholesaler, broker, trader, final buyer) also
affects a credit's selling price. See, e.g., U.S. Gov'r ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CARBON OFFSETS: THE U.S. MARKET iS GROWING, BUT QUALITY ASSURANCE POSES CHALLENGES FOR
MARKET PARTICIPANTS (2008) (report to congressional requesters), available at http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d081048.pdf.
167HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 160, at 52 fig.22.
168THE GOLD STANDARD, ANNEXES TO TOOLKr, Annex A (2008) (on file with the
Harvard Environmental Law Review).
"6Social Carbon, How it Works, http://www.socialcarbon.com/en/?page=HowItWorks
(last 170
visited Apr. 16, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
Id.
"' NEW CARBON FIN., VOLUNTARY CARBON INDEX (VCI) 2 (2008), available at http://
newcarbonfinance.com/download.php?n=NCF NAVoluntaryCarbonlndex_2008_082.pdf&f
=FileName&t=NCFdownloads.
1721d. (noting "demand from pre-compliance buyers willing to pay above average
prices").
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Evaluating and Quantifying Social Justice

Just as carbon offset projects are vetted to ensure that their contribution
improves the business-as-usual scenario in terms of GHG emissions,
projects should be assessed to ensure that they result in a net social justice
improvement.173 Development of market-worthy EMOs will be difficult
without rigorous evaluations of effectiveness. Many methodologies have
been developed to quantify GHG emissions reductions by comparing a baseline case with a project's end results,'74 but measuring the results of a social
justice improvement can be difficult. Justice improvements are often context-dependent.' 75 Identifying measurable indicators of social justice improvements is more challenging than weighing a ton of carbon, and the costs
of measuring the social justice impacts of small projects could overwhelm
the benefits of the offsets or inhibit their pursuit.
Despite the difficulties of assessing social justice, project developers
and third party verifiers could make reasonable approximations of improvements relative to established regional targets. A sufficient metric could be as
simple as a yes-no qualification decision by the offset creator or third-party
certifier, or assignment to one of several broad grade levels of impact.'76 If
the market demands quantifiable measures of social justice achievements,
programs can be evaluated on a metric of qualitative and quantitative measures that are scaled so that EMO initiatives can be compared for their effectiveness at promoting improvements in social justice (e.g., in ways similar to
those deployed by CDM Gold Standard and Social Carbon). Social justice
assessments also could be based on the social performance evaluation systems developed for microfinance institutions. For example, the Consultative
Group to Assist the Poor, a group of twenty-eight agencies supporting
microfinance, created an analysis of households' relative poverty status that
can be used to place a household into one of three categories based on its

173

See Brooke A. Ackerly, Feminist Theory, Global Gender Justice, and the Evaluationof

Grant-Making, 37 PHIL. Topics 2, pts. I & H (forthcoming 2009) (on file with the Harvard
Law Review)
Environmental
74
1
ANJA KOLLMUSS ET AL., MAKING SENSE OF THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKET: A
COMPARISON OF CARBON OFFSET STANDARDS (2008), available at http://assets.panda.org/
downloads/vcm reportfinal.pdf.
175See Ackerly, supra note 173 (manuscript at 7-8).
176 One such scenario would create a social justice credit by comparing improvements to
targets established by the Millennium Development Goals ("MDG"). See United Nations,
Millennium Development Goals 2015, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (last visited Apr.
26, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). For example, if the EMO
funds are transferred in the form of a loan to a woman, as is common in microfinance, it could
receive direct recognition for its contribution to the MDG of gender equity. Mark M. Pitt et
al., Empowering Women with Micro Finance: Evidence from Bangladesh, 54 ECON. DEv. &
CULTURAL CHANGE 791 (2006); MDG Monitor, Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women, http://www.mdgmonitor.org/goal3.cfm (last visited Apr. 26, 2009) (on file with the
Harvard Environmental Law Review) (referring to share of women in wage employment in the
non-agricultural sector).
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established poverty index. 77 In addition, the Millennium Development
Goals developed by the United Nations may contribute to the development
of useful poverty alleviation measures for EMOs. 75
In addition to serving as the basis for an EMO, establishing a common
metric for assessing social justice improvements could benefit not only the
carbon markets, but also other institutions that interact with and affect the
lives of disadvantaged populations. For example, a common metric also
could be applied to the efforts of microfinance institutions as they attempt to

improve the lives of households in developing countries. A common metric
would enable NGOs that concurrently address GHG emissions and social

justice (e.g., The Converging World) to boost the level of transparency to
donors. 17 9 Overall, the metric could help reduce bias in the comparison of
different activities and perhaps serve as a basis for premiums on certain
products when established targets are exceeded.
3.

Equity Micro-Offset Projects

We envision equity micro-offsets as a mechanism to reduce carbon
emissions in parallel with improving social justice. EMOs are carbon credits

generated in the process of improving social equity, with the proceeds of

selling the credits helping the project to pay for itself.180 A simplified means
to bring EMOs to market could follow the label and endorsement routes
' THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR ("CGAP"), THE POVERTY AUDIT 8
(2003), available at http://www2.ids.ac.uk/impact/files/reviews/CGAP-poverty-audit.pdf; see
also CGAP, Advancing Financial Access for the World's Poor, http://www.cgap.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). For additional
information about social performance assessment tools, see The Microfinance Gateway,
MicroFinance Initiatives, Social Performance Assessment Tools, http://www.microfinancegate
way.com/resource centers/socialperformance/article/35397 (last visited April 15, 2009) (on
file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
171See United Nations, supra note 176; G.A. Res 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24,
2005) (resolution revising the eight MDGs); MDG, Official List of MDG Indicators, http:H
mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm (last visited Apr. 15,
2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (noting that MDG goals are to
(1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve maternal
health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop global partnership for development). For data by series, see MDG
Indicators, Data Availability by Series and MDG Region, http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data
Availability.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law
Review). The indicators of the poverty goal do not focus on raising overall GDP per capita,
but rather on raising the well-being of the least well off.
179 The Converging World is an NGO that uses donations to finance wind turbines. Those
turbines are used to generate revenue via the sale of electricity and carbon credits, and the
profits are donated to the charity Social Change and Development, which applies the funds
toward education, health, and environmental projects in the developing world. The Converging World, About Us, http://www.theconvergingworld.org/document-l .aspxid=0:37374 (last
visited Apr. 15, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
"SoSee Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 1, at 68-69; Ackerly & Vandenbergh, supra
note 1, at 563. Unfortunately, no economically viable methodology exists that will enable
generation of carbon credits based on OECD residential energy improvements; the revenue
from these credits is relatively insubstantial (based on a potential annual reduction of up to
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taken by the Gold Standard and Social Carbon. Current market participants
would be encouraged to rate their activities according to accepted methodologies. The incentive for positive ranking may support a premium for their
product, and the premium in turn may be used to fund additional projects.
Although more research remains to be done, the premium commanded by
existing offsets with a social justice component suggests that EMOs may be
able to generate a price premium in the carbon credit markets. In addition,
the success of organizations such as Global Giving demonstrates that a large
market exists for low transaction cost, Internet-driven systems that transfer
money from multiple small donors to multiple small-scale projects designed
to alleviate poverty in the developing world.'81
The development of the EMO market could be enhanced by linking it to
the growing microfinance movement. Collectively, microfinance institutions have in excess of $25 billion in loans outstanding.8 2 A recent study of
microfinance institutions and their funding sources indicated this money
comes from donations (26%), non-commercial borrowing (11%), equity
(13%), commercial borrowing (23%), and deposits (27%). 183 Microfinance

institutions make substantial efforts to rate the social performance of their
lending, 184 but their measurement schemes do not appear to include GHG
emissions impacts. In addition, in the absence of a focus on GHG emissions, microfinance activity can lead to additional carbon emissions. 8 s Integrating even a rough GHG assessment into microfinance lending criteria
may not only enhance GHG global emissions reduction efforts, but also increase the pool of potential investors. Given the importance of climate
change and climate change mitigation costs to the communities served by
microfinance institutions, these institutions may become leading investors in
EMOs. Carbon projects that generate credits by mitigating industrial gases
have been criticized for contributing little in the way of additional social
benefits. 18 6 A linkage between carbon projects and social projects may be
mutually beneficial.
Recent initiatives demonstrate the feasibility of projects that could generate EMOs. The first involves ongoing efforts to promote improved cook
several tons of CO 2eq per house, and a very modest per-ton value of CO 2eq, amounting to less
than $30/house/year) and must be combined with other funding sources.
'8 See Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 1, at 14 & n.59.
182 DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH, MICROFINANCE: AN EMERGING INVESTMENT OPPORTU-

Nrry 7, 18 (2007), available at http://www.dbresearch.de/PROD/CIBINTERNETENPROD/PROD0000000000219174.PDF.
'83 Robert Cull et al., Microfinance Meets the Market 34 tbl.4 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4630, 2008), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract= 1149133.
4 See discussion supra note 177.
185 See supra note 134 and accompanying text (noting that increasing income in poor
populations in India and China leads to increasing appliance and electricity usage); see also
Shahidur R. Khandker, Microfinance and Poverty: Evidence Using Panel Data from Bangladesh, 19 WORLD BANK ECON. REv. 263, 266 (2005) (noting that "[i]ncome or consumption poverty can be reduced through interventions such as microfinance that help the poor
become self-employed and generate income").
'86 See KoLtMUSS ET AL., supra note 174, at 22.
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stoves 187 ("ICSs") by carbon project developers and microfinance groups.
We discuss ICSs further in Part II.C, but for our purposes here the key point
is that traditional biomass-fueled cooking has several downsides that ICSs
could address: it is inefficient and thus generates higher-than-necessary op-

erating costs; it generates large amounts of black carbon, a remarkably important contributor to climate change;'

s

and contact with the smoke and ash

emissions is linked to significant health issues.'89 EMO project developers

could bundle large numbers of ICSs to generate substantial amounts of GHG

emissions reductions and social justice benefits. 190 Microfinance institutions
could provide the initial capital to facilitate the generation of the offsets.
A second example involves the handling of manure from livestock and

poultry, along with other biological wastes. These waste streams yield a
substantial amount of methane, a greenhouse gas twenty-one times more potent than carbon dioxide.' 9' When fermented, these waste streams can be
used as sludge to fertilize crops, and the off-gas can be used as a substitute
for wood, agricultural residue, animal dung, or other fossil fuels. 92 Because

even small-scale fermenting units can generate biogas and fertilizer that can
be sold for a profit, microfinance institutions have extended funding to these
types of projects. 93 Carbon project developers also have embraced this pro"' ICS distribution has been helped by both carbon finance and microfinance. See, e.g.,
Climatecare, Uganda Efficient Stoves, http://www.jpmorganclimatecare.com/projects/countries/Uganda-efficient-stoves/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (noting role of voluntary carbon finance and microfinance in ICS
distribution). A Gold Standard Methodology has been established for carbon credits based on
ICS. See Gold Standard Foundation, Methodology for Improved Cook-Stoves and Kitchen
Regimes V.01, http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/uploads/fileVO1%2010-05-08%20GS%20
Cook-stove%20Methodology.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
188 See Ramanathan & Carmichael, supra note 127, at 221-22; see also Rosenthal, supra
note 127, at Al, A12 (noting that according to Stanford professor Mark S. Jacobson, it is
"bizarre" that black carbon is not a part of proposed policy architectures); JP Morgan, ClimateCare, Uganda Efficient Wood Cook Stoves (n.d.), available at http://www.jpmorganclimatecare.com/media/documents/pdf/PINUganda_- 0015B Wood%20Stoves.pdf (noting
project that "involves the dissemination of efficient wood cook stoves to institutions and families in and around Kampala, Uganda").
89See Min Bikram Malla et al., Presentation to the 136th Annual Meeting and Expo of
the American Public Health Association: Climate Change, Cook Stoves, and Coughs & Colds:
Evidence from Rural Nepal on Thinking Global, and Acting Local (Oct. 29, 2008), available
at http://apha.confex.com/apha/136am/techprogrami/paper_185626.htm (reporting that implementing ICS technology led to reductions in PM concentration (10 to 70%), acute respiratory
illnesses (10 to 30%), medical costs (10 to 50%), cooking and collection time (20%), fuelwood
consumption (25%), and GHG emissions (25%)); see also M. I. Howells et al., A Model of
Household Energy Services in a Low-Income Rural African Village, 33 ENERGY POL'Y 1833
(2005).
190Initial activity in this area has already begun. See ClimateCare, supra note 187.
'"' IPCC AR4 WG I, supra note 7, at 212 tbl.2.14.
192See Guozhu Li et al., Assessment of Environmental and Economic Costs of Rural
Household Energy Consumption in Loess Hilly Region, Gansu Province, China, 34 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1438, 1441 (2009).
113See Elizabeth Israel et al., Note from India: Greening Microfinance to Turn Waste Into
Wealth, http://www.microlinks.org/ev-en.php?ID = 28405_201 &ID2 = DO-TOPIC (last visited
Apr. 19, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review); see also Sunderasan
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cess as a means to mitigate GHG emissions. 94 Similar to the dissemination
of improved cook stoves, biogas initiatives require initial capital, but they
can yield GHG and social justice outcomes.
4.

Integration into Public Governance Schemes

The voluntary carbon market serves as an example of how private governance that arises in the shadow of a larger regulated compliance market
can complement public governance and can test concepts for inclusion in
public governance.195 In the longer run, international, regional, and national
cap-and-trade schemes could expand the reach of EMOs by allowing EMOs
to satisfy regulatory requirements for allowance-holding. 96
C. Long-Term Initiatives
Equity micro-offsets and other initiatives hold out the prospect for nearterm emissions reductions that contribute to improvements in well-being. In
the longer term, much more fundamental changes may be needed if the goal
is to achieve by 2050 global per capita emissions that are equal to India's
two-ton level today. The option that seems to be off the table in current
debates is a deeper macro-transformation of the relationship between well-

being, material throughput, and carbon emissions on a global scale.'97 Such
transformations can be induced by policies directed toward particular sectors, recognizing that these can be interrelated through either production or

Srinivasan, Positive Externalities of Domestic Biogas Initiatives: Implicationsfor Financing,
12 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 1476, 1478 (2008).
194THE GOLD STANDARD FOUND., INDICATIVE PROGRAMME, BASELINE, AND MONITORING

(2007), available at http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/uploads/file/GS%20biodigester%20methodology%20
301007%2OFinal.pdf.
"I For a discussion of the relationship between private and public environmental governance, see Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543,
551-56 (2000); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REv.
2029, 2037-41 (2005). A recent example of a movement of a climate governance regime from
the private to the public arena is the regulatory adoption by states of reporting protocols established by the California Climate Action Registry, a private non-profit organization. See Carbon Positive, CCAR Forest Protocol, http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspxarticleID
=1367 (last visited Apr. 26, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
96 Not surprisingly, a recent comparison of economic agreement structures concludes that
distributional justice issues, as measured by income distribution across regions, improves
when REDD is added to cap-and-trade, as does efficiency. Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at 15
(noting that "the inclusion of avoided deforestation among the mitigation options leads to an
improvement in the distribution of income across regions"). Our proposal incorporates REDD
concepts, but it goes beyond REDD to include households and small businesses even when
their carbon impact is not associated with deforestation or land use.
197 To change the amount of well-being produced by any GHG-emitting behavior, we need
other transformations: economic, financial, infrastructural, and political. See WORLD BANK,
supra note 147, for emphasis on "political economy considerations and the role of institutions
and governance since these issues are more often than not the binding constraints to progress."
METHODOLOGY FOR SMALL SCALE BIODIGESTER: VOLUNTARY GOLD STANDARD
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consumption, or they can be focused on more structural transformations that
affect the carbon footprint of an entire community. 98
In the housing sector, energy savings and increases in well-being are
possible by scaling up the individual cook stove initiatives discussed above.
These ICS projects are examples of household-level micro-initiatives that
benefit people in poverty by targeting their largest GHG-emitting and highest cost activities. These initiatives substantially reduce household energy
use and carbon emissions while improving well-being in a variety of ways
that are not captured by changes in per capita income or similar measures.
The potential impact of the cook stove initiative is an average 39%
reduction in CO 2eq emissions from domestic cooking in developing regions. 99 Around the world, two billion people rely on wood or charcoal for
cooking fuel. 2°° Much of the emissions growth that is expected to occur by
2050 will occur in countries with large populations that will otherwise rely
on wood or charcoal for cooking. 20 For example, countries most likely to
have high demand for improved cook stoves include three of the five biggest
current and projected future GHG-emitting countries, India, China, and Brazil.102 ICSs can be made with inexpensive materials. 2 3 They are simple to
assemble and easy to use. Similarly, more efficient wood and 20charcoal
stoves have achieved CO 2eq emissions reductions of almost 4 0% .
The most obvious increase in well-being from the switch to efficient
cook stoves is savings in time, energy, or money associated with securing
adequate fuel. Significant improvements also may occur in health and security. With fuel savings, more people may pasteurize water, which prevents water-borne diseases.20 Efficient cook stoves also reduce air
198 See, e.g., PEsKETr ET AL., supra note 149 (reviewing the range of transformational
impacts of programs for reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation); Ctr. for Org.
Research & Educ., ProvisionalAgenda Item 3: Special Theme: Climate Change, Bio-Cultural
Diversity and Livelihoods: The Stewardship Role of Indigenous Peoples and New Challenges2
(2008), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/E_C 19_2008_CRP5.pdf
199Michael Johnson et al., Quantification of Carbon Savings from Improved Biomass
Cookstove Projects, 43 ENVTL. Sci. TECH. 2456, 2456 (2009); see also Solar Cookers International, Where Solar Cook?, http://solarcookers.org/basics/where.html (last visited Apr. 19,
2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). These initiatives can also be
targeted at people who are in or near poverty in the developed world as well. Vandenbergh &
Ackerly, supra note 1, at 61-62.
200 Solar Cookers International, Why Solar Cook?, http://solarcookers.org/basics/why.html
(last visited Mar. 20, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
20"See discussion supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text (discussing projected emissions growth in developing countries).
202 See Solar Cookers International, supra note 199 (listing twenty nations with highest
solar cooking potential, including India, China, and Brazil).
203 Id.
204 See Johnson et al., supra note 199, at 2456; see also JP Morgan, supra note 188.
205 In 2002 3.5 million people died as a result of water-related diseases, making waterborne diseases a leading health concern. A. PROSS-UsTON Er AL., WORLD HEALTH ORG.,

SAFER WATER, BETTER HEALTH: COSTS, BENEFITS AND SUSTAINABILITY OF INTERVENTIONS TO
PROTECT AND PROMOTE HEALTH 12 (2008), availableat http://www.who.int/water sanitation_

health/publications/safer water/en!; Annette Pruss et al., Estimating the Burden of Disease
from Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene at a Global Level, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 537
(2002).
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pollutants and their associated health risks, including chronic lung and heart
disease. These negatively affect those who cook (generally women) and
those they look after (young children and older people). Efficient cook
stoves also reduce weight when women must carry fuel on their heads (headloading). Head-loading causes prolapsed uterus, which causes increases in
maternal mortality and stillbirths.2°6 Finally, women and girls in refugee
camps and areas of conflict and violence are physically vulnerable in their
search for fuel. Efficient stoves increase well-being by diminishing these
exposures as well.2 0

Transformational change is also possible in the forestry and agriculture
sectors. As we discussed in Part I, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to
achieve global per capita emissions of two tons per person without major
reductions in emissions from these sectors. Fortunately, recent experimentation in each sector suggests that it is possible for changes in these sectors to
contribute substantially to decreases in climate impact and increases in wellbeing.
For example, the Green Belt Movement BioCarbon Project is a large
scale reforestation enterprise that consists of small community-based reforestation projects.2 8 Communities secure a long-term license for the use of
all non-wood forest products with the possibility of renewal. Communities

("Forest User Groups") give the Green Belt Movement the CDM rights in
exchange for tree planting support, land rents, payments for surviving trees,
and a share of the carbon revenues. The Green Belt Movement sells those

rights to pay for the activities, and the World Bank finances the enterprise by
securitizing the future carbon revenues from the CDM market. 2°9
206 Ctr. for Sci. & Env't, CSE Draft Dossier on Health and Environment: Vulnerable
Groups 15-20 (draft for conference, Mar. 24-25, 2006), available at http://www.cseindia.org/
programme/health/pdf/conf2006/b 1women.pdf.
207 See Mieko Nishimizu, Energy, Health, and Gender - Thinking Differently About
What We Do, Keynote Speech at the Regional Workshop on Household Energy, Indoor Health
Pollution and Health, New Delhi, India (May 9, 2002), available at http://www.cleanaimet.
org/caiasia/ 1412/articles-35922_recurso_1 .pdf (discussing a range of health and environmental
hazards of development including head-loading); Jerome Nriagu et al., Environmental Risks
and Disease Burdens in Developing Countries, in ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH: FROM GLOBAL

TO LOCAL 310 (Howard Frumkin ed., 2005).
208 See, e.g., Green Belt Movement, Green Belt Movement/World Bank Biocarbon Project. Description of Green Belt Movement's Carbon Credit Project (2006), availableat http://
www.greenbeltmovement.org/a.php?id=197 (providing description of the project). For descriptions of similar projects, see The Equilibrium Fund, Reforestation, Food Forests and Carbon Offsets (2007), available at http://www.theequilibriumfund.org/page.cfm?pageid=5494;

JosHI GOPA,

THE CHIPKO MOVEMENT AND WOMEN (Sept. ed. 1982), available at http://www.

pucl.org/from-archives/Gender/chipko.htm.

For other programs and models, see LORENA

AGUILAR ET AL., REFORESTATION, AFFORESTATION, DEFORESTATION, CLIMATE CHANGE AND

GENDER (2007); Boyd, supra note 125, at 4-9.
209 See Press Release, World Bank, World Bank & Greenbelt Movement Project to Reforest Regions of Kenya (Nov. 15, 2006), availableat http://www.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNALUNEWS/0,,contentMDK:21133046-pagePK:34370-piPK:34424-theSitePK:4607,00.
html; FREDERICK NAJAU & IRENE MutHuKA, KENYA GREEN BELT MovEMEr REFORESTATION PROJECT BIOCF PROJECT (2008), available at http://www.whrc.orglAfricalassets/
NjauandMuthuka-GBM%20Reforestation%20CDM%20Project.pdf.
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Many opportunities also exist for transformative change in the agriculture sector. We focus here on the energy use associated with fertilizer for
two reasons. First, fertilizer production is a very energy-intensive part of the
agricultural process. 21 0 Second, claims about the fertilizer-dependent green
revolution model of agriculture and its productivity are a potential reason
why the climate impact of the agricultural sector cannot be addressed if
world food needs are to be met.
A review of the literature prepared by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations shows that organic agriculture2 1 1 can increase
productivity, decrease the need for inputs (including fertilizer and irrigation),
increase resilience in the face of environmental stresses (e.g., drought,
floods) and local pests and diseases, increase food security and income se11 2
curity through multi-cropping, and decrease food dependency on imports.
Moreover, organic sustainable agriculture could meet growing global demand.213 Fortunately, this form of agriculture also can increase the wellbeing of farmers and consumers.2 14 Health and nutrition benefits for consumers can arise from the variety of locally grown fruits and vegetables that
are often grown organically. Benefits can arise for farmers from the lack of
exposure to pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers that are spread by hand in
much of the developing world.
These initiatives in households, forestry, and agriculture are examples
of locally appropriate strategies for improving well-being while decreasing
GHG emissions. They have been successful and deployed in multiple con210 Jason McKenney, Artificial Fertility: The Environmental Costs of IndustrialFertilizers,
in FATAL HARVEST: THE TRAGEDY OF INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE 239 (Andrew Kimbrell ed.,
2002) ("The production of nitrogenous fertilizers consumes more energy than any other aspect
of the agricultural process."). In addition, as Tilman et al. anticipate,

Should past dependences of the global environmental impacts of agriculture on
human population and consumption continue, 109 hectares of natural ecosystems
would be converted to agriculture by 2050. This would be accompanied by 2.4- to
2.7-fold increases in nitrogen- and phosphorus-driven eutrophication of terrestrial,
freshwater, and near-shore marine ecosystems, and comparable increases in pesticide
use. This eutrophication and habitat destruction would cause unprecedented ecosystem simplification, loss of ecosystem services, and species extinctions.
David Tilman et al., Forecasting Agriculturally Driven Global Environmental Change, 292
SCIENCE 281, 281 (2001).
211 For examples of organic and integrated agriculture, see descriptions of projects in Vietnam, Heifer International, http://www.heifer.org/site/c.edJRKQNiFiG/b.201470/ (last visited
Apr. 26, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review); in India, Navdanya,
http://www.navdanya.org/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental
Law Review).
212 Nadia EI-Hage Scialabba, Conference on Organic Agriculture and Food Security, Oslo,
Norway, Can Africa Feed Itself? OrganicAgriculture and Food Security in Africa 5 (June 6-8,
2007).
213 See id. (concluding that "[r]ecent models of a hypothetical global food supply grown
organically indicates that organic agriculture could produce enough food on a global per capita basis for the current world population: 2640 and 4380 kcal/person/day, depending on the
model used" (citations omitted) (emphasis in original)).
214 For example, benefits may arise from increased consumption of fruits and vegetables
and reduced exposure of farmers to pesticides.
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texts. They exhibit the core characteristics of a new path for climate justice
policy discussions.
Of course, many questions remain about such initiatives, including how
each might be scaled up or replicated in general and in any particular setting.
Our purpose is not to answer these questions, but to reorient the climate
change-global justice scholarship and policy dialogue so that more of us are
asking these questions and developing policy-relevant proposals.
III.

CONCLUSION

Climate change and global justice are difficult to address together, but
it is unlikely that either will be resolved if they are treated as separate issues.
We should not allow opaque, optimistic assumptions to obscure the choice
we are making to forgo even a reasonable aspiration of achieving the widely
adopted 2°C target. Instead, we should confront the hard questions that arise
when we try to develop policy architectures and initiatives that enable us to
achieve that target. When we do so, we will be forced to confront the essential relationship between climate change and global justice, and we will be
forced to add a new, transformative set of approaches to the current proposed policy architectures. We have proposed several core characteristics of
the new policy architectures, as well as examples of near-term and long-term
initiatives.
As we indicated at the outset, it is possible that climate sensitivity will
turn out to be less than currently projected, that revolutionary development
and adoption of technology will occur, that markets and policy implementation will function perfectly, that per capita incomes will increase without
inducing GHG emissions that exceed emissions targets, and that the other
optimistic assumptions of proposed policy architectures will turn out to be
sound. Many, if not all, of these assumptions need to be sound to substantially reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change, however. There is little
margin for error, and the accumulation of optimistic assumptions raises serious concerns about the plausibility of the current policy architectures. We
suggest that it is only prudent to be transparent about these assumptions so
that conscious choices can be made about whether more fundamental - and
more difficult - steps are worth taking. If we fail to confront the hard
questions, we will not even have the opportunity to make the hard choices.

